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ABSTRACT 
Presently, there is lack of clarity regarding the objectives of board 
gender diversity laws across jurisdictions. This Article reviews the 
current laws and regulations for corporate gender diversity across 
countries and finds two separate problems that current laws address. 
The first problem is that board effectiveness is hampered by 
homogeneity and the second problem is the lack of gender equality in 
the corporate context. However, current gender diversity laws do not 
address either of these issues individually. Instead, there is a conflation 
of both these issues, because of which the laws are only able to provide 
superficial solutions.  
To appropriately tailor the board gender diversity laws to the two 
problems, this Article argues a move toward a revised framework, or 
“corporate diversity 2.0.” Specifically, the Article focuses on the 
second problem of the lack of “gender equality” and argues that it 
should be framed more broadly as equality at the workplace rather 
than merely on the corporate board. 
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INTRODUCTION 
s Victor Hugo famously said, “You can resist an invading army; 
you cannot resist an idea whose time has come.”1 In recent years, 
the idea of diversity, particularly gender diversity, on company boards 
has gathered enough momentum to be regarded as “an idea whose time 
has come.” However, in our eagerness to give effect to this idea, we 
must be wary of regulations and proposals that are not optimal or are 
even counterproductive.  
The gender diversity focus in the corporate context, in some 
European jurisdictions, has led to mandatory quotas for women sitting 
on company boards.2 Other jurisdictions with softer regulations, such 
as “targets” and “disclosure rules,” are also hearing calls for quotas 
because these softer regulations have not resulted in an immediate 
increase in the percentage of women directors. 
Further, a few recent studies and commentators have pointed out that 
an increase in women directors has not led to an increase in the number 
of women CEOs.3 This exclusive focus on women’s representation in 
boards is shallow and counterproductive. It is shallow because it does 
not seek to address the root of the problem and, instead, merely 
attempts to provide a cosmetic fix at the top. It is counterproductive 
because the board of directors is a crucial organ of the corporation and 
its composition should be designed to ensure that it functions optimally, 
as per the needs of each company.  
What is required, therefore, is an evaluation of the problem that such 
regulations intend to address and the suitability of such regulations to 
address the problem. At present, we do not have a proper statement of 
the problem to tailor regulations. Instead, we have preconceived 
1 This, and other variants of this quote, are attributed to Victor Hugo. The original quote 
appeared in Histoire d’un Crime [The History of a Crime]. See VICTOR HUGO, HISTOIRE 
D’UN CRIME (T.H. Joyce & Arthur Locker trans., 1877), http://www.gutenberg.org/ 
files/10381/10381-h/10381-h.htm. 
2 Norway, France, and Spain are examples. For a comprehensive review of countries 
with a mandatory quota for women directors, see Sandeep Gopalan & Katherine Watson, 
An Agency Theoretical Approach to Corporate Board Diversity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 
45–52 (2015). 
3 See, e.g., James Fernyhough, Almost Every Single CEO of an ASX 200 Company Is a 
Man, THE NEW DAILY (Nov. 15, 2017), http://thenewdaily.com.au/money/finance-
news/2017/11/15/almost-every-ceo-asx-200-company-man/; Kieran Guilbert, More Women 
on UK T10 Boards but Top Jobs Out of Reach: Rep., REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-work-women/more-women-on-uk-boards-but-
top-jobs-out-of-reach-report-idUSKBN1D92JH. 
A 
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solutions in the form of quotas or targets at the board level, 
accompanied by different rationales for such measures offered after the 
fact.  
For instance, the equality rationale claims that gender diversity 
regulations address workplace equality issues.4 The economic 
rationales claim that these regulations are aimed at improving business 
outcomes and profitability, which would mean that they are addressing 
efficiency problems in businesses.5 Corporate governance arguments, 
usually subsumed within the umbrella of the economic rationales, 
claim that such regulations will improve board discussions and 
decisions, thus implying that they are addressing governance problems 
in companies.6 
Additionally, two recent stories from Silicon Valley are recounted 
below, to further emphasize the imminent need for Corporate Diversity 
2.0.  
The first story involves Google and its former employee, James 
Damore, who (while he was employed at Google) circulated a 
document that criticized the company for vilifying those with differing 
views on the issue of gender diversity.7 According to Damore, the 
disparity in the proportion of men and women at software engineering 
companies and in leadership positions might not only be due to 
discrimination but also in part to the “differences in distributions of 
traits between men and women.”8 Such differences, according to 
Damore’s document, are not only attributable to social conditioning but 
also to biological differences.9 He also went on to discuss what he calls 
4 See, e.g., Peta Spender, Gender Diversity on Boards in Australia—Waiting for the 
Great Leap Forward?, 27 AUSTRALIAN J. CORP. L. 22, 23 (2012). Spender argues that 
although it is often represented that women make a “choice” to opt out of their careers to 
care for children and elders, it is a structural impediment rather than a choice. See also Joan 
Acker, From Glass Ceiling to Inequality Regimes, 51 SOCIOLOGIE DU TRAVAIL 
[SOCIOLOGY OF WORK] 199, 206 (2009). Acker argues that one way to offset the structural 
barriers faced by women is the introduction of policies that are accommodative of such 
family demands and offer professionals ways to accommodate home responsibilities along 
with their careers. 
5 See generally Deborah H. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate 
Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377 (2014). 
6 AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY 15 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2015); Rene B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact 
on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (2009).  
7 James Damore, Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber (July 2017), https://assets. 
documentcloud.org/documents/3914586/Googles-Ideological-Echo-Chamber.pdf. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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“Google’s political orientation and moral biases.”10 Eventually, as a 
result of the document, Damore was fired by Google, with its CEO 
Sunder Pichai explaining that the document had crossed a line by 
“advancing harmful gender stereotypes in the workplace.”11 
A psychology professor was quoted by the Guardian as having said 
that some of Damore’s ideas were familiar to her as part of her research 
(even if there was no consensus around them). She also said that there 
was “something quite extraordinary about someone losing their job for 
putting forward a view that is part of the scientific debate.”12 While 
there is no firm agreement among psychologists about these claimed 
gender differences,13 the incident illustrates that we lack an atmosphere 
that is conducive to an evaluation of various views and solutions around 
this issue.14  
Further, coercing people into agreeing with a certain view might 
prove counterproductive. As Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev have 
concluded based on interviews they conducted with managers and 
executives in the United States, voluntary diversity training often 
works better than mandatory diversity training at organizations.15 The 
Google incident was a missed opportunity to foster a discussion and 
analysis of views around diversity. In addition to this, the incident 
might also have served as an opportunity to investigate if unconscious 
bias was not the only reason for the lower number of women in top 
company positions. As this Article will discuss, hostile work 
environments and the lack of gender-neutral promotion metrics may 
contribute to the lower number of women in top management positions, 
including positions on boards, and these issues must be addressed. 
Consistent with this, Dobbin and Kalev found that mentoring, college 
10 Id. 
11 Sunder Pichai, Note to Employees from CEO Sunder Pichai, GOOGLE BLOG (Aug. 8, 
2017), https://www.blog.google/topics/diversity/note-employees-ceo-sundar-pichai/. 
12 Paul Lewis, “I See Things Differently”: James Damore on His Autism and the Google 
Memo, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/ 
nov/16/james-damore-google-memo-interview-autism-regrets. 
13 Id. 
14 For a more detailed discussion of the diversity issues around the Google incident and 
its implications, see Akshaya Kamalnath, A Memo to Google—Firing Employees with 
Conservative Views is Anti-Diversity, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://theconversation.com/a-memo-to-google-firing-employees-with-conservative-views-
is-anti-diversity-82318. 
15 Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Diversity Programs Fail, THE HARV. BUS. 
REV. (July-Aug. 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/why-diversity-programs-fail. 
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recruitment of women and minorities, and appointing a dedicated 
diversity officer are programs that have been effective, in addition to 
voluntary diversity training.16 
The second story involves another Silicon Valley giant, Apple. A 
few months after the Google incident, Apple’s diversity head, Denise 
Young Smith, made a reference to “diversity of viewpoints” and this, 
like Damore’s memo, again resulted in public outcry. The statement 
that became controversial was as follows: “And I’ve often told people 
a story—there can be 12 white blue-eyed blonde men in a room and 
they are going to be diverse too because they’re going to bring a 
different life experience and life perspective to the conversation.”17 
Ultimately, she apologized for the statement, via an internal memo, 
saying that her statements “were not representative of how I think about 
diversity or how Apple sees it” and that Apple’s commitment to racial 
and gender diversity was “as strong as it has ever been.”18 Just a month 
later, Apple announced that Smith would be leaving the company at the 
end of the year.19  
Yet again, this was a missed opportunity to discuss the importance 
of viewpoint diversity in corporate boards and whether indicators, apart 
from gender and race, should be considered under the rubric of 
diversity. Further, the incident is another illustration of the 
repercussions of attempting to stray from the currently accepted idea of 
diversity. It is unsurprising then that out-of-the-box solutions for 
diversity have not emerged. 
It is evident that the individuals involved, Damore and Smith, had to 
face repercussions for thinking outside the generally accepted narrative 
of diversity in the corporate context. These two episodes must serve as 
cautionary tales for us as a society because it is necessary to be able to 
evaluate and discuss all aspects of an issue before arriving at optimal 
solutions. Thus, this Article aims to take on the task of discussing and 
analyzing the difficult arguments around the issue of gender diversity 
16 Id. 
17 AppleInsider Staff, Apple Diversity Chief Apologizes for Controversial Choice of 
Words at Summit, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 13, 2017), https://tech crunch.com/2017/10/13/apple-
diversity-head-denise-young-smith-apologizes-for-controversial-choice-of-words-at-
summit/. 
18 Matthew Panzarino, Apple Diversity Chief Apologizes to Staff for Statements Made at 
Summit, APPLEINSIDER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:52 PM), https://appleinsider.com/articles/ 
17/10/13/apple-diversity-chief-apologizes-to-staff-for-statements-made-at-summit.  
19 Jacob Kastrenakes, Apple’s First Diversity Chief Is Leaving After Less Than a Year, 
THE VERGE (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/11/16/16667510/apple-
diversity-chief-leaving-after-less-than-a-year. 
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on company boards to propose an improved diversity regime that 
overcomes the shortcomings in the current regulations. 
Part 1 of this Article seeks to define the problem that is being 
addressed by board gender diversity laws and regulations. Because of 
the lack of clarity in this regard, Part 1 takes a backward approach by 
first reviewing board gender diversity regulations and rationales 
offered in support of them, and then attempting to distill the core 
problem being addressed by such regulations out of that analysis. Part 
2 finds that there are two different problems addressed by diversity 
regulations, namely board effectiveness and gender equality in the 
workplace. Part 2 further finds that these regulations, as they are framed 
in most countries, seem to understand diversity almost exclusively in 
terms of gender. This implies that the problem being addressed is that 
of gender equality, although various governments have claimed that the 
issue of board effectiveness is also being addressed. Part 1 then argues 
that even if the aim is simply to address the problem of gender equality 
in the corporate context, the current regulations do not address the root 
of the problem. 
To elucidate the problems at hand and optimal solutions, Part 3 next 
studies the case of Uber with respect to the recent allegations of sexism 
and a toxic work culture. The allegations eventually resulted in a full-
fledged report by Eric Holder and his associates. This report makes 
important observations and suggestions regarding diversity and 
inclusion, which are worth discussing and building upon in the context 
of companies of different sizes.  
This Article discusses the need to rethink the diversity discourse 
based on recent allegations of sexual harassment, race discrimination, 
and shareholder engagement. Part IV lays out the framework for 
Corporate Diversity 2.0 to help companies address diversity issues and 
to address these issues more effectively. This framework draws from 
the Holder Committee Report and from useful aspects of existing 
regulations and policy suggestions in various countries.  
Finally, the conclusion reiterates the need for boards to take diversity 
and related issues seriously and for the diversity discourse to be 
remapped based on lessons from such incidents and their handling, i.e., 
missteps in Silicon Valley.  
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I 
GENDER DIVERSITY REGULATIONS: A SOLUTION IN SEARCH OF A 
CLEARLY DEFINED PROBLEM 
Many countries have introduced legislation and softer regulations 
with the aim of increasing gender diversity on company boards. The 
policy rationales underlying such regulations are a mix of many 
arguments, including the need to make boards more representative of 
the population, make boards more effective, make companies more 
profitable, and ensure gender equality. It is unclear what specific 
problem(s) the legislation or regulation is trying to address. This 
section reviews the relevant law and the underlying rationale(s) in 
different countries, with the aim of understanding the specific 
problem(s) addressed by such laws. 
Norway stands out as the first country to introduce regulations 
related to board gender diversity and as the country with the toughest 
sanctions for noncompliance with such regulations. However, it also 
represents the broad thrust of the discourse of board gender diversity in 
Europe and internationally. In contrast, the United States has fewer 
onerous regulations in this regard and focuses on board diversity more 
generally. However, even in the United States, concerns of gender 
diversity have started taking on greater importance than other forms of 
diversity. The United Kingdom and Australia have used targets and 
disclosure requirements and have focused primarily on gender 
diversity.  
This Section will review the regulations introduced in Norway, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia and the rationales 
underlying the regulations in each of these jurisdictions. Based on this 
review, it will clarify the problem(s) sought to be addressed by these 
regulations.  
A. Norway: The First Quota Law
Norway was the first country to introduce legislation aimed at 
increasing the number of women directors on company boards.20 In 
2003, Norway introduced a quota to the boards of state-owned 
companies, municipal companies, and companies incorporated by 
20 Julia Carpenter, The Case for and Against Gender Quotas on Corporate Boards, CNN 
MONEY (Sept 7, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/07/pf/gender-diversity-quotas/ 
index.html. 
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special legislation.21 Based on the public hearings, Norway decided to 
make these measures applicable to public limited liability companies 
as well.22 These measures took effect through the Public Limited 
Companies Act amendment to require a representation of at least forty 
percent for each gender on boards of public limited companies.23  
Section 6–11a24 of Norway’s Companies Act now reads as follows: 
Requirement regarding the representation of both sexes on the board 
of directors 
(1) On the board of directors of public companies, both sexes shall
be represented in the following manner:
1. If the board of directors has two or three members, both sexes shall
be represented.
2. If the board of directors has four or five members, each sex shall
be represented by at least two.
3. If the board of directors has six to eight members, each sex shall
be represented by at least three.
4. If the board of directors has nine members, each sex shall be
represented by at least four, and if the board of directors has more
members, each sex shall be represented by at least 40 percent.
Essentially, the law describes how public companies are to meet the 
forty percent requirement for various board sizes. Norway introduced 
this requirement in three phases, with an initial window of two years 
that allowed for companies to voluntarily comply.25 The first phase was 
from January 1, 2004, to December 31, 2005, when compliance with 
the law was voluntary. The legislation stipulated that the rule would be 
made mandatory only if companies did not, by July 1, 2005, have an 
21 Act of 19 December 2003 No. 120, pt. XII, para 1, Follow-up to the Package Meeting 
of 9 to 10 November 2005 Regarding Representation of Both Sexes on Company Boards at 
3, ROYAL MINISTRY OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY AFFAIRS, http://www.regjeringen.no/ 
upload/BLD/Engelsk/Balanced%20gender%20representation%20on%20company%20boa
rds/Svarbrev_til_ESA_19122005.pdf; DHIR, supra note 6, at 104. 
22 DHIR, supra note 6, at 104. 
23 Amendment to the Public Limited Companies Act, Ot.prp. Nr. 97 (2002–2003) (Nor.). 
24 Allmennaksjeloven, lovav June 13, 1997 nr. 45 (Norwegian Public Limited Liability 
Companies Act of 13 June 1997 No. 45), available in an unofficial English translation at the 
website of the Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo Bors), http://www.oslobors.no/ob-eng/Oslo-
Boers/Regulations/Acts-and-regulations. 
25 CHRISTA TOBLER, GOING GLOBAL IN SEX EQUALITY LAW: THE CASE OF GENDER 
REPRESENTATION RULES FOR COMPANY BOARDS, 894 (Mario Monti et al. ed., 2007). 
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aggregate of forty percent women directors on their boards.26 During 
this time, companies had the opportunity to voluntarily rectify gender 
imbalances on their boards without government intervention to 
mandate quotas. However, by July 1, 2005, less than sixteen percent of 
the directors on all public companies were women. This percentage was 
much lower than what the government had intended.27 While this was 
still a large jump in a two-year period, it was not even close to the 
intended forty percent.28 As a result, the government made quotas 
mandatory starting on January 1, 2006.  
This mandatory quota system initiated the second phase, when all 
existing companies were given a two-year transitional period to meet 
the representation levels prescribed by the quota.29 Companies that 
failed to comply with the requirement could be dissolved by a court 
after having been given sufficient notice.30 To further facilitate the 
implementation of this law, the Norwegian government set up a 
database of female directorial candidates for corporations to consider.31 
Eventually, despite protesting the new measure, almost all public 
companies in Norway complied. However, some public companies 
chose to convert to private companies rather than comply with the new 
measure.32  
Finally, in the third phase that began January 1, 2008, the regulation 
required all public companies to comply with the forty percent quota 
measure.33 The highest noncompliance penalty in section 6-11a allows 
for a noncompliant company to be dissolved.34 Although this penalty 
seems excessively harsh, a company is only actually dissolved after 
several warnings and opportunities for the company to comply with the 
quota.35  
26 Beate Sjåfjell, Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and its Impacts: Is the Example of 
Norway a Way Forward? 20 DEAKIN L.R. 25, 28 (2015). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 DHIR, supra note 6, at 105. 
30 TOBLER, supra note 25; Julie Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public 
Office to Corporate Boards, INT’L J. CONST. L. 449, 450 (2012). 
31 Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on 
Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 127 Q. J. ECON. 137, 145 
(2011). 
32 Sjåfjell, supra note 26. 
33 DHIR, supra note 6, at 105. 
34 Norwegian Pub. Limited Liability Companies Act, 45 § 16–15 (1997). 
35 Sjåfjell, supra note 26, at 32. 
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1. Rationale
While some have argued that the gender quota in Norway has been
introduced to promote gender equality, others firmly believe that it is a 
measure to improve corporate governance. The rationale for the law is 
better understood in the context of Norway, where there is a tradition 
of gender quotas in the public sector. The deregulation and 
privatization of these enterprises in the 1980s and 1990s had raised 
concerns about the subsistence of the welfare state model.36 In the 
context of gender equality, the concern was about the inapplicability of 
provisions of the Gender Equality Act (which regulated the gender 
composition of publicly appointed boards, councils, and committees) 
to boards of non-state-owned companies.37 It would seem that these 
concerns were addressed by introducing the mandatory quotas on the 
boards of companies in Norway’s company law legislation.  
Officially, the Norwegian legislation mandating corporate gender 
quotas was justified with two reasons: 1) balanced participation is a 
question of democracy,38 and 2) securing women’s influence in 
decision making processes is  important for the economy.39 Explaining 
the democracy argument, a member of parliament said that because 
“market forces might be said to be more important than ever before, it 
is even more important that women are well-represented where power 
is situated within the companies and the boards.”40  
However, in response to the business community’s opposition to the 
law, Laila Dåvøy, the then minister of children and family affairs, 
emphasized, during the parliamentary debate, that it was more a matter 
of diversity than a quota law.41 Thus, she seems to have promoted the 
amendment as a corporate governance issue, because diverse boards 
36 MARI TEIGEN, GENDER QUOTAS ON CORPORATE BOARDS: ON THE DIFFUSION OF A 
DISTINCT NATIONAL POLICY REFORM, 115–27 (Frederik Englestad & Mari Teigen eds., 
Firms, Boards and Gender Quotas: Comparative Perspectives Comparative Social Research, 
Emerald Grp. Pub’g Ltd. 2012).  
37 Id. 
38 See generally Agnes Bolsø, Ignore the Doubters. Norway’s Quota on Women in the 
Boardroom is Working, THE GUARDIAN (July 18, 2011, 5:30 PM), https://www. 
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jul/18/diversity-boardroom-corporate-decisions. 
39 Id. 
40 HILDE BJØRKHAUG & SIRI SØRENSEN, FEMINISM WITHOUT GENDER? ARGUMENTS 
FOR GENDER QUOTAS ON CORPORATE BOARDS IN NORWAY, 199 (Fredrik Englestad & 
Mari Teigen eds. Firms, Boards and Gender Quotas: Comparative Perspectives Comparative 
Social Research, Emerald Grp. Publ’g Ltd. 2012). 
41 Id. at 200. 
124 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 20, 113 
benefit from a variety of perspectives while making corporate 
decisions. On the other hand, calling the amendment a quota law would 
imply that the main aim was to achieve balanced gender representation 
on company boards. Her entire argument was as follows: 
The Government wants to pave the way for increased value creation 
in business. The problem today is not that there are no qualified and 
suitable women. The problem is to ensure that the skills women 
possess, are used. This is what the rules on gender representation 
should do something about. Increased diversity in the boardroom can 
help improve the strategic choice, enhance innovation, speed up 
restructuring and thus improve profitability. Increasing the 
proportion of women in boards enhances diversity. . . . Finally, I 
would not call this a gender quota reform. It is diversity we talk about, 
diversity in boardrooms.42 
This statement has been argued to reflect a strategic shift in the 
government’s rationale while contextualizing the measure for the 
private sector because the grounds for the business community’s 
opposition of the measure was mostly based on shareholder property 
rights.43  
Yet, Dåvøy has emphasized that the measure is one of diversity 
rather than a gender quota. Although the gender quota measure was 
originally conceived of in the context of the gender equality legislation, 
there seems to have been a transformation in the rationales provided 
while introducing similar measures in the companies’ legislation. 
Consistent with this, Hilde Bjørkhaug and Siri Sørensen, based on their 
review of the many rationales, find that the argument most strongly 
emphasized in the context of the gender quota law for companies in the 
private sector is profitability.44  
According to Bjørkhaug and Sørensen, since profit maximization 
seems to be the dominant goal of the private sector, the government 
had to downplay the equality arguments and instead focus on linking 
the law to profitability considerations.45 On the contrary, Professor 
Sjåfjell argues that the very fact that noncompliance with the measure 
could result in dissolution of the company (at the extreme), indicates 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 251. The shareholder property rights argument in this regard is that, since the 
corporation is conceived of as the property of the shareholders, imposing a gender quota on 
the board would interfere with the property rights of shareholders. 
44 Id. at 189–99. 
45 Id. at 200. 
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that it is a core company law measure—unlike corporate social 
responsibility regulations—that are invariably voluntary.46  
However, in deciding the concerns or motivations behind a law, 
whether or not strict penalties are attached to such a law is not the 
determinative factor. Further, the emphasis on gender diversity, to the 
exclusion of other forms of diversity, makes it obvious that gender 
equality was the key concern driving the law reform. Other aspects, like 
the impact of such a law on profitability of the company, are secondary. 
In contrast, the focus of the diversity rule in the United States is much 
broader, as the next section shows. 
B. United States: The Diversity Disclosure Rule
While the discourse in Norway used the general terminology of 
diversity, the specific focus was on gender diversity. In the United 
States, the discussion about board composition, especially diversity, 
has been broader from the outset. It is interesting to note that the board 
diversity discussion in the United States preceded the discussion in 
Norway, despite Norway being the first country to introduce legislation 
on the issue.  
Leading commentators in the United States had linked the discussion 
of board independence to diversity as early as the 1990s. In fact, the 
board gender diversity discussion in the United States can be broken 
into two phases. The first phase involved the homegrown development 
of the board diversity discourse as a corporate governance measure. 
This phase resulted in companies being required to disclose their 
diversity policy and details regarding it, if they had one in place. The 
second phase was the diversity discourse, influenced by international 
developments, that focused more on gender diversity rather than on 
general diversity. 
1. Phase I: The Early Discourse About Board Diversity in the United
States
Excerpts from a panel discussion on corporate law reforms held at
Fordham Law School in 1997 (where experts from academia and 
industry members were present) show that diversity had already found 
its way into the corporate governance conversation. Reverend Dr. Andy 
Smith, the director of an activist investor firm said, in the context of 
corporate misconduct, that “the question was not simply one of 
46 Sjåfjell, supra note 26, at 33. 
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independence but also one of diversity.” The term “diversity” for him 
encompassed not just gender diversity but also racial diversity.47  
Speaking on behalf of his firm, Dr. Smith explained that diversity 
added something to shareholder value because “it reflects what our 
society is about and it brings in a different perspective that often is very 
helpful in the management of the corporation.”48 In the same panel, 
Richard Schlefer, who represented a pension fund, also mentioned that 
the fund considered diversity as a corporate governance issue. Schlefer 
also said that they had filed several shareholder resolutions49 asking 
companies to seek ways to improve board diversity, but companies 
responded saying that the type of diverse candidates they sought were 
in short supply.50 Other shareholder proposals regarding diversity had 
been made during this time. Although there was no resultant impact on 
diversity, these proposals established that diversity was a shareholder 
concern and set the foundation for the Security Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) introduction of the diversity disclosure rule in 
2010.51  
Apart from institutional investors, in 1999 the Conference Board (an 
organization consisting of senior executives from all industries aiming 
to explore ideas of business policy and practice) had published a study 
to show that board diversity could increase shareholder value.52 Since 
the Conference Board consists of the top executives in the United 
States, such a publication signaled that business leaders believed that 
diversity was profitable.53  
Apart from the above study that focused on board diversity, the 
Conference Board had published other earlier reports about the value 
of diversity at all firm levels.54 Thus, the issue of board gender diversity 
seems to have followed the broader issue of workforce diversity in the 
United States. Ultimately, the diversity discourse was firmly rooted in 
shareholder value and effective corporate governance.  
47 Jill Fisch, Reform: Are There Too Many Cooks in the Corporate Kitchen?, 2 
FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX. L.F. 67, 82 (1997). 
48 Id. at 82–83. 
49 A shareholder resolution is a proposal submitted by shareholders to be voted upon at 
the annual meeting. Id. at 57. 
50 Id. 
51 Thomas Lee Hazen & Lissa Lamkin Broome, Board Diversity and Proxy Disclosure, 
37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 39, 44 (2011). 
52 Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85, 97 n. 
57, and 98 n. 63 (2000). 
53 Id. at 98. 
54 Id. at 98 n. 61. 
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2. The Diversity Disclosure Rule
Based on the above-mentioned developments, the concept of board
diversity in general has now been incorporated in the U.S. disclosure 
regime. Public companies are required to comply with a range of 
reporting requirements. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires 
that company shareholders, whose securities are listed on a national 
stock exchange, receive a proxy statement prior to a shareholder 
meeting (regardless whether an annual or special meeting).55 The 
information contained in the statement must be filed with the SEC 
before soliciting a shareholder vote on the election of directors and the 
approval of other corporate actions.56  
After the financial crisis of 2008, the law was amended to include 
certain additional disclosures.57 Following this, from February 2010, 
listed companies are required to disclose their diversity policy for 
nomination of directors, if they have one in place, and describe its 
implementation in their annual proxy and information statements.58 
The relevant portion of the law states that companies are to disclose a 
range of details regarding their director nomination process. The item 
corresponding to diversity states as follows: 
[D]escribe the nominating committee’s process for identifying and
evaluating nominees for director . . . and whether, and if so how, the
nominating committee (or the board) considers diversity in
identifying nominees for director. If the nominating committee (or
the board) has a policy with regard to the consideration of diversity
in identifying director nominees, describe how this policy is
implemented, as well as how the nominating committee (or the
board) assesses the effectiveness of its policy.59
The disclosure about diversity is with reference to whether it is a 
consideration for the company in the nomination process. Where such 
a diversity policy exists, the rule requires companies to disclose the 
implementation and effectiveness of the policy as assessed by the 
nomination committee of the board. While there is no need to explain 
why there is no diversity policy in place if the company does not have 
55 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012). 
56 Id. 
57 SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RELEASE NOS. 33-9089; 34-61175; IC-29092, 
PROXY DISCLOSURE ENHANCEMENTS (2009), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-
9089.pdf [hereinafter PROXY DISCLOSURE ENHANCEMENTS]. 
58 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2017). 
59 Id. 
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one, more detailed disclosures are required when the company has a 
diversity policy.  
A significant point here is that the rule does not define the term 
“diversity,” and it is up to companies to define the term. In its proposal 
document, the SEC anticipated that companies might, and would likely, 
define diversity differently. While some companies might define 
diversity in terms of demographic aspects like race, gender, and 
nationality, other companies might define it in terms of diversity of 
viewpoint, educational qualifications, and professional experience.60 
The proposal document explains that “companies should be allowed to 
define diversity in ways that they consider appropriate.”61 These 
parameters show that the SEC specifically chose not to define the term 
to allow companies flexibility.62 
3. Rationale
Before the diversity disclosure rule was enforced, the SEC called for
comments to determine whether disclosures related to board diversity 
should be required. A number of commenters responded that board 
diversity was important information for investors.63 Their reasoning 
was that the disclosure would provide investors with information about 
the company’s corporate culture and governance practices with which 
they could make informed voting and investment decisions. While 
some scholars had noted that board diversity would improve corporate 
performance, the SEC’s focus has been that information about the 
company’s diversity policy and its implementation would be important 
to investors.64  
Further, the SEC states that the requirement for diversity-related 
disclosure is not meant to steer the behavior of corporations to appoint 
more diverse candidates on their boards.65 Yet, scholars have been 
critical of the rule, saying that the SEC has, through this requirement, 
aimed to influence corporate behavior through “social shaming” that 
may result from the information being disclosed.66 However, Professor 
Dhir has argued that the rule fits within the two key goals of securities 
60 PROXY DISCLOSURE ENHANCEMENTS, supra note 57, at 39. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 38. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 80. 
66 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, 
21, 34 (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012). 
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regulation, namely encouraging informed investor decision-making 
and reducing agency costs.67 In its argument that making boards more 
independent will reduce agency costs, the SEC alludes to the link 
between board diversity and independence when it states that, while 
looking for diverse candidates, boards might be forced to look outside 
their existing networks and, ultimately, create a resulting board more 
independent of management.68 Further, it states that where the 
company was in need of more independence, a diverse board would 
lead to improved corporate governance.69 The SEC explains that such 
improved governance might be the result of the availability of different 
viewpoints.70  
Between the SEC’s reasoning and the lack of focus on gender or race 
as forms of diversity, it is clear that the board diversity rule was not 
exclusively motivated by concerns of gender or race equality. Rather, 
the rule gives companies the flexibility to define diversity as they deem 
most suitable to their specific context.  
Consistent with this flexibility, Dhir’s analysis of proxy statements 
from 2010 to 2013 showed that only fifty percent of the companies 
defined “diversity” to include gender.71 Thus, “gender” was not 
perceived as the overarching feature of the diversity disclosure rule. 
4. Phase II: The More Recent Board Diversity Discourse in the
United States
The former Chair of the SEC, Mary Joe White, referring to the fact
that most companies had not provided details about gender, racial, and 
ethnic diversity, said that investors were unsurprisingly not satisfied 
with the lack of detail and specificity in the disclosures.72 She also said 
that the rule was intended to “meaningfully inform investors.” Since 
the diversity rule was not serving the intended purpose, the rule needed 
to change. Possibly alluding to vague disclosures, she said that the “lens 
67 DHIR, supra note 6, at 93. 
68 PROXY DISCLOSURE ENHANCEMENTS, supra note 57, at 80. 
69 Id. 
70  Id. at 81. 
71 DHIR, supra note 6, at 191. 
72 Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address, International 
Corporate Governance Network Annual Conference: Focusing the Lens of Disclosure to Set 
the Path Forward on Board Diversity, Non-GAAP, and Sustainability (Speech delivered at 
the International Corporate Governance Network Annual Conference, California, June 27, 
2016), (https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-icgn-speech.html). 
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of board diversity disclosure needs to be re-focused in order to better 
serve and inform investors.”73 With a new SEC Chair, Jay Clayton, at 
the helm since 2017, it remains to be seen whether the “re-focusing,” 
with respect to gender diversity, will be in keeping with the 
international discourse.  
Institutional investors have displayed their dissatisfaction not only 
with the lack of specificity in the disclosures but also with the lack of 
results in terms of actual diversity, particularly gender diversity, on 
company boards. One example is the California State Teachers’ 
Retirement System (CalSTRS), which aims to increase female 
representation on the boards of companies in which it invests. CalSTRS 
publicly criticized Facebook in 2012 for its all-male board, ahead of its 
initial public offering, to pressure Facebook into hiring women 
directors.74 Investor pressure on companies, specifically with regard to 
diversity, has only intensified since these instances of activism. In fact, 
2016 has been termed a breakout year for gender diversity in the United 
States, with shareholder proposals meeting with increased success.75 
Additionally, commentators have predicted that gender diversity is 
likely to one day become a standard aspect of board composition.76 As 
a result, the international focus on gender diversity has slowly come to 
dominate the diversity conversation in the United States as well. 
Unable to ignore the issue anymore, the business community has not 
just passively responded to investor pressure, but has also actively 
contributed to the diversity discourse. The recent Commonsense 
Principles of Corporate Governance drafted by some of the leading 
executives in the United States, argues that directors should be drawn 
from a diverse pool and that diversity is critical to a high-functioning 
board.77 However, their focus is on diversity in general and not 
restricted to gender diversity. The relevant principle about diversity 
states: “Directors should have complementary and diverse skill sets, 
73 Id. 
74 Bianca Bosker, Facebook’s All-Male Board Draws Investor Scrutiny—But Don’t 
Count on Change, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 2, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/ 
entry/facebook-all-male-board-_n_1263278. 
75 David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: Prioritizing 
Board Diversity, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/30/corporate-governance-update-prioritizing-
board-diversity/. 
76 Id. 
77 TIM ARMOUR ET AL., COMMONSENSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 1 
(2016), http://www.governanceprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Governance 
Principles_Principles.pdf.  
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backgrounds and experiences. Diversity along multiple dimensions is 
critical to a high-functioning board. Director candidates should be 
drawn from a rigorously diverse pool.”78 Clearly, the focus is on 
diversity in terms of skill sets, backgrounds, and experiences instead of 
a sole focus on gender. The principles further state that “no one size fits 
all” which shows that they support a flexible approach.79  
Next, the Business Roundtable, an organization consisting of CEOs 
of major U.S. corporations, released its principles of corporate 
governance in August 2016, where it specially advocated that 
nominating committees should develop a framework for considering 
minority and women candidates for each board seat.80 Even here, the 
specific principle dealing with board composition only refers to 
diversity in general, while special mention is made to women and 
minorities in an explanatory note on diversity. The relevant principle is 
as follows: “The composition of a board should reflect a diversity of 
thought, backgrounds, skills, experiences and expertise and a range of 
tenures that are appropriate given the company’s current and 
anticipated circumstances and that, collectively, enable the board to 
perform its oversight function effectively.”81 This quotation elaborates 
on the meaning of diversity by proposing that boards should develop a 
framework for identifying “appropriately diverse candidates that 
allows the nominating/corporate governance committee to consider 
women, minorities and others with diverse backgrounds as candidates 
for each open board seat.”82 Therefore, the Business Roundtable has 
explicitly focused on women and minorities, while also leaving room 
for “others with diverse backgrounds,” which could encompass 
candidates who bring other types of diversity. For instance, educational 
qualifications, background, or age.  
C. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom follows a voluntary and target-based approach 
to ensure gender diversity on company boards. The 2010 Corporate 
Governance Code (the Code) sets out the recognized corporate 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 11 (2016), 
https://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/Principles-of-Corporate-Governance-
2016.pdf. 
81 Id. at 11. 
82 Id. 
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governance standards for companies listed in the United Kingdom.83 
Companies in the United Kingdom that have a premium listing84 on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) must report on how they applied the 
Code. The Code’s provisions were amended in 2014 to include the 
recommendations of the Davies Report (commissioned to promote 
gender equality on the boards of listed companies).85 Principle B of the 
Code, which deals with board appointments, states that the appointment 
process for new directors must be formal and rigorous.86 The 
supporting principle then states: “The search for board candidates 
should be conducted, and appointments made, on merit, against 
objective criteria and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on 
the board, including gender.”87 There is an emphasis on gender even if 
the principle is attempting to overcome the informal nature of board 
appointments.  
Similarly, the supporting principle requiring disclosure of the 
process of board appointments in the annual report requires that the 
disclosure “should include a description of the board’s policy on 
diversity, including gender, any measurable objectives that it has set 
for implementing the policy, and progress on achieving the 
objectives.”88 The other pertinent principle in the Code relates to board 
evaluation. It states that the board should undertake a “formal and 
rigorous evaluation” of its performance including that of its committees 
and individual directors.89 The supporting principle to this, explains 
that “[e]valuation of the board should consider the balance of skills, 
experience, independence and knowledge of the company on the board, 
its diversity, including gender, how the board works together as a unit, 
and other factors relevant to its effectiveness.”90 In evaluating the 
83 FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, REVISIONS TO THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODE (FORMERLY THE COMBINED CODE) (2010), https://www.icaew.com/en/library/ 
subject-gateways/corporate-governance/codes-and-reports/uk-corporate-governance-code 
[hereinafter THE CODE 2010]. 
84 As per 2010 changes to the Financial Services Authority (FSA), only voting equity 
shares can have premium listing. See Kobi Kastiel, High Growth Segment: New Route to 
UK’s Equity Capital Markets, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. 
(Apr. 30, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/04/30/high-growth-segment-new-
route-to-uks-equity-capital-markets/. 
85 LORD DAVIES, WOMEN ON BOARDS 6 (2011) [hereinafter DAVIES REPORT]. 
86 THE CODE 2010, supra note 83, at 11, 13. 
87 Id. 
88 Id; see also THE CODE 2010, supra note 83, at 12. 
89 See THE CODE 2010, supra note 83, at 16.  
90 Id. 
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board’s effectiveness, one of the considered factors is diversity. It is 
important to note that, in the above quotation, special mention is given 
to gender diversity.  
In particular, international disclosure seems to have influenced the 
emphasis on gender diversity. This emphasis can also be seen in 
countries like the United States. The U.K. Corporate Governance Code 
is informed by a series of committee reports on corporate governance. 
The first report that mentions board diversity is the 1998 Hampel 
Report. This report referred to diversity in terms of experience.91 While 
the report did not favor “diversity for its own sake to give a politically 
correct appearance,” it acknowledged that “there are people from other 
fields who can make a real contribution on the board.”92  
Subsequently, the Higgs Review and the Tyson Report (both of 
which studied the role, effectiveness, and recruitment of nonexecutive 
directors), along with the Davies Report, influenced the development 
of the diversity discourse in the United Kingdom, and ultimately, 
resulted in the Corporate Governance Code of 2014. The rationale for 
the Code, and its 2014 reiteration, emerges from a brief look at these 
reports. 
1. The Higgs Review
The Higgs Review, published in 2003,93 postulated that the lack of
diversity was a consequence of the informal basis in which board 
appointments were made.94 Since personal contacts were used as the 
main source of finding candidates, those with similar backgrounds to 
the incumbent directors were favored.95 Calling this a “natural bias,” 
the Higgs Review noted that a rigorous appointment process would 
offset it.96 There was also special focus on appointing women, and the 
review identified some roles and professions that could be sources of 
potential board candidates. These roles and professions included 
lawyers, accountants, human resource professionals, those in positions 
91 HAMPEL COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT 
3.15 (1998). 
92 Id. 
93 DEREK HIGGS, REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTORS, 10.24, (2003) [hereinafter HIGGS REVIEW]. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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just below the board level, directors of private companies, and 
individuals from public and charitable sectors.97  
Alongside the strong emphasis on merit, the review emphasized that 
board composition is a “signal” about the values of the companies. The 
review added that a “commitment to equal opportunities which can be 
of motivational as well as reputational importance is inevitably 
undermined if the board itself does not follow the same guiding 
principles.”98 Here, there is a reference to the equality rationale that 
notes that the board’s composition signals a company’s commitment to 
equal opportunity. However, the problem is that board composition is 
not an effective signal of the entire company’s commitment to equal 
opportunity. Board diversity does not highlight whether diversity is 
achieved, or even aimed for, at other levels of the workforce.  
With respect to women, the review states that the criteria used for 
selection may also implicitly discriminate against women by, for 
example, requiring senior executive or public company board 
experience.99 The Higgs Review also proposed the creation of a group 
of business leaders, and others, to suggest how companies might draw 
on broader pools of talent to enhance board effectiveness. The review 
had further proposed that the group must pay particular attention to 
ways of bringing in candidates from the noncommercial sector who had 
the skills and experience relevant to board functioning. The group 
created for this purpose was chaired by Laura D’Andrea Tyson, which 
published the Tyson Report.100 Again, although the mandate of the 
Tyson Report is a helpful first step, it can only be an interim measure 
if equal opportunity is the rationale for board gender diversity 
regulations. Measures should also be introduced to ensure that women 
progress naturally up the various levels in the company. 
2. The Tyson Report
The Tyson Report made three main recommendations. First, it
reiterated the Higgs Review by recommending that the selection 
process for nonexecutive directors should be made more rigorous and 
transparent.101 Second, it recommended that formal training and 
97 Id. at 10.25–10.32. 
98 Id. at 10.16. 
99 Id. at 10.24. 
100 LAURA TYSON, RECRUITMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF NON-EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTORS (2003) [hereinafter TYSON REPORT]. 
101 Id. at 19. 
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evaluation of board members were necessary.102 Third, it recommended 
an initiative to measure board diversity in a reliable manner, which 
would encourage and monitor companies’ progress.103  
The Tyson Report noted two reasons for ensuring board diversity. 
The first—and more fundamental reason—was a merit argument to 
find and employ the best talent.104 With respect to board functioning, it 
is noted that diversity of skills and background among nonexecutive 
directors “is likely to provide the broad mix of relevant experiences and 
to foster the independence of mind, the probing, challenging attitude, 
and the sound judgement,” which is required for effective board 
performance.105 Thus, like the SEC in the United States, the Tyson 
Report made the link between diversity and independence, and it did 
not limit the definition of diversity to gender or race. On the contrary, 
it emphasized “independence of mind” or viewpoint diversity. 
The second reason cited is that board diversity enhances the 
company’s reputation. Meaning, a diverse board will be more sensitive 
to a wider range of possible risks to its reputation. The Tyson Report 
illustrates this by example of nonexecutive directors with experience in 
customer relations, human resources, or environmental regulation 
being able to help a company contain risks in such areas.106 Further, a 
diverse board will send a positive signal to various stakeholder groups; 
this will be especially beneficial in companies with diverse employee 
and customer groups.107 Finally, companies with a diverse board will 
build a reputation as responsible corporate citizens who understand the 
community and are deserving of its trust.108 
The report does not stop at merely recommending board diversity 
through formal recruitment practices, but also identifies possible 
sources to draw candidates for board positions. Sources that are 
identified in the commercial sector are the “marzipan layer” (also 
known as the “second rung”) of company management and 
professional areas working in advisory roles.109 While CEOs would be 
hard-pressed for time, the marzipan layer of company management 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 20. 
104 Id. at 7. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 12–13. 
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could engage better with their duties as nonexecutive directors.110 The 
report also recommends searching for candidates from the 
noncommercial sectors like the charity sector, where successful 
individuals tend to have attributes essential for nonexecutive 
directors.111 
Interestingly, although the Tyson Report has called for diversity of 
backgrounds, age, gender, ethnicity, and nationality, the suggestions to 
widen the pool from which nonexecutive directors are hired focus 
primarily on women. The report found that women are more likely to 
take up professional consulting positions and can likely be found in the 
charity sector leadership positions.112 However, the report also 
expressly mentions the need for foreign nationals, especially on boards 
of companies with international operations.113 
3. The Davies Report
In 2011, the Davies Report was commissioned by the minister for
business and the minister for women, as a first step to the incoming 
government’s pledge to “look to promote gender equality on the boards 
of listed companies.”114 The specific commission mandate was to 
“undertake a review of the current situation, to identify the barriers 
preventing more women reaching the boardroom and to make 
recommendations regarding what government and business could do to 
increase the proportion of women on corporate boards.”115  
Clearly, this is not merely seen as a corporate governance initiative 
like in the previous committee reports. Yet, the report states at the 
outset that “the issues debated here are as much about improving 
business performance as about promoting equal opportunities for 
women.”116 So, even if the goal is focused on business performance, 
that goal must include striving for equal opportunities for women. It is 
unsurprising that this report, unlike the previous reports which only call 
for diversity among nonexecutive directors, addresses the need for 
more women executive directors.117 Also, although the previous reports 
had confined themselves to recommending diversity on the board, the 
110 Id. at 12. 
111 Id. at 13–14. 
112 Id. at 12, 14. 
113 Id. at 14. 
114 DAVIES REPORT, supra note 85, at 6. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 7. 
117 Id. at 19, 21 (recommendations 1 and 9). 
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Davies Report recommends that companies must disclose the 
percentage of women on their boards and the percentage of women in 
executive positions and in the entire organization.118  
Ultimately, the Davies Report does not recommend quotas because 
“board appointments should be made on the basis of business needs, 
skill and ability.”119 Even though the Davies Report’s starting point is 
gender equality, it seems to subscribe to the view that “one size does 
not fit all” and, therefore, board appointments should be based on 
individual, specific company needs. This view provided the basis for 
the business case for board gender diversity as canvassed by the report. 
It summarizes the business case as having four key dimensions, 
namely: (1) improving performance, (2) accessing the widest talent 
pool, (3) being more responsive to the market, and (4) improving 
corporate governance.120  
The Davies Report’s claim that more women directors result in 
better firm profitability is based on a few studies. Moreover, the report 
notes that one way women directors “improve performance” is by 
making the board more independent.121 The report also claims that 
women directors help overcome “groupthink” by bringing different 
perspectives and debate to the board.122 Attention is also paid to studies 
that show that women directors reduce the likelihood of insolvency, 
thus situating the arguments in the post crisis concern about the 
likelihood of companies becoming insolvent.123 Even within the 
business efficiency and corporate governance arguments, the exclusive 
focus is on gender diversity, disregarding the fact that other forms of 
diversity on the board offer similar benefits.124 
118 Id. at 19 (recommendation 2). 
119 Id. at 18. 
120 Id. at 8. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 9. 
124 For a more detailed discussion on the phenomenon of “groupthink” on corporate 
boards and ways in which gender diversity and other forms of diversity might help in 
overcoming it, see Akshaya Kamalnath, Gender Diversity as the Antidote to “Groupthink” 
on the Corporate Board, 22 DEAKIN L. REV. 85 (2017). The article argues that attributes 
like the ability to think independently and offer differing viewpoints help to counter 
groupthink, gender diversity might not be the only type of diversity that offers such benefits. 
Diversity of nationality, for instance, might offer similar benefits since such directors do not 
belong to the same geographical networks as directors and executives. 
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The talent pool argument notes that an equal or greater number of 
women, compared to men, are graduating with professional degrees 
and that company boards must tap into this “talent pool” in order to 
stay competitive.125 The market responsiveness argument essentially 
says that women directors would understand and respond to the needs 
of female customers better.126 This is required since women constitute 
a majority of the population, of the workforce, and are estimated to be 
responsible for seventy percent of household purchasing decisions.127 
Of course, the report does not consider that such an argument would 
not be applicable to businesses with few female customers or 
businesses that hire external consultants to help them appeal to women 
customers. 
The corporate governance argument in the report relies on one 
Canadian study that found that more gender-balanced boards “were 
more likely to identify criteria to measure strategy, monitor its 
implementation, follow conflict of interest guidelines and adhere to a 
code of conduct.”128 This study also quotes a Harvard Business study 
claiming that women tend to be “more assertive” about corporate 
governance issues.129  
The Davies Report made ten recommendations to “generate 
momentum behind and increase focus on the business priority,” which 
basically encapsulates the voluntary approach of soft targets and 
disclosure that the United Kingdom has followed since 2011.130 The 
key aspects of the recommendations are summarized below: 
a. Targets and Disclosure (Recommendations 1 and 2)
All the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 companies
should set out a target percentage of women directors they hope to have 
by 2013 and 2015 respectively. Of these, FTSE 100 companies must 
aim to achieve a minimum of twenty-five percent women directors by 
2015. The company is free to decide the breakdown of this percentage, 
but the report recommends that the aim must be to appoint both 
executive and nonexecutive directors who are women.131 Apart from 
125 DAVIES REPORT, supra note 85, at 9. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 10 (citing DAVID A.H. BROWN ET AL., WOMEN ON BOARDS: NOT JUST THE 
RIGHT THING . . . BUT THE ‘BRIGHT’ THING (The Conference Board of Canada 2002)). 
129 Id.  
130 Id. at 18. 
131 Id. at 18–19. 
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setting these targets, the companies must also disclose the percentage 
of women on the board, women in senior executive positions, and 
women in the whole organization.132 
b. Disclosures About the Recruitment Process (Recommendations
3–10)
The report recommended amending the U.K. Corporate Governance
Code to require listed companies to establish a policy on board 
diversity, create measurable objectives to implement such policy, and 
to annually disclose a summary of the policy and progress made in 
achieving the objectives.133 These requirements are meant to provide 
more information to investors and customers to allow for more 
informed company decisions.134 
Further, the report required companies to describe the work of the 
nomination committee. This work includes the process used by the 
nomination committee to make board appointments in a separate 
section of the annual report. The Davies Report requires investors to 
pay close attention to all the information provided about diversity, 
nomination, and recruitment of directors in the annual report.135 
Overall, these recommendations are both asking companies to make 
diversity-related disclosures and exhorting investors to pay attention to 
this information.  
The Davies Report provides further recruitment process guidance by 
encouraging companies to periodically advertise nonexecutive board 
positions in order to gather as diverse a range of applications as 
possible.136 The report further recommended that executive search 
firms draw up a voluntary conduct code addressing best practices 
related to gender diversity that cover search criteria and appointment 
processes.137 
Finally, the Davies Report noted that two different populations of 
women must be recognized and developed: (1) executives from within 
the corporate sector, and (2) women from outside the corporate 
mainstream like academics, civil servants, entrepreneurs, and women 
132 Id. at 19. 
133 Id. at 19–20. 
134 Id. at 20. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 21. 
137 Id. 
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in professional services. Further, the Davies Report recommends that 
boards pay attention to training and development of potential board 
members.138 In closing, the report stated that the members of the 
committee lead by Lord Davies would meet every six months to 
consider progress regarding the Davies Report’s recommendations and 
would report annually on the same.139 
As a result of the Davies Report’s recommendations, the Financial 
Reporting Council amended the U.K. Corporate Governance Code in 
2014 to include provisions to streamline board appointments and 
performance.140  
4. Financial Reporting Council (FRC) Consultations and the U.K.
Corporate Governance Code of 2014
Since the Davies Report called on the FRC to amend the U.K.
Corporate Governance Code, the FRC released a consultative 
document on gender diversity.141 This document clarified that the goal 
of the Corporate Governance Code was “improving the quality and 
functioning of corporate boards, rather than any wider social 
objectives.”142 Thus, the FRC’s rationale for board diversity is solely 
based on its potential benefits with respect to board effectiveness. The 
consultative document lists out three potential benefits: first, a diverse 
board can overcome “groupthink;” second, ensuring that women are 
considered for board positions would mean that a wider talent pool is 
being used; and third, boards with women directors could connect 
better with the workforce and with customers.143 
The U.K. Corporate Governance Code of 2014 limits the corporate 
diversity discourse to board effectiveness, although the reports 
informing it also seek to address issues of equal opportunity. The 2014 
Code explicitly states that board diversity includes, but is not limited 
to, gender and race.144 Yet, the Code contains rules pertaining to 
disclosure of gender diversity on the board and no specific rules on 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
(2014), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/59a5171d-4163-4fb2-9e9d-daefcd7153b5/ 
UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-2014.pdf [hereinafter THE CODE 2014].  
141 FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, CONSULTATION DOCUMENT: GENDER 
DIVERSITY ON BOARDS 1–2 (2011), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/4684a139-525d-
40c5-b911-54599c1ec32c/;.aspx. 
142 Id. at 3. 
143 Id. 
144 See id.; THE CODE 2014, supra note 140. 
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other forms of diversity, which is probably a consequence of the Davies 
Report. Ultimately, although various problems and corresponding 
solutions seem to have been articulated by the reports informing the 
2014 Code, the diversity rules limit their focus to gender diversity. 
D. Australia
Australia, like the United Kingdom, requires disclosures related to 
gender diversity, following an approach sometimes described as the 
“comply or explain” or the “if not, why not” approach. Along with this 
requirement, there is a range of other programs, like mentoring and 
scholarships to support training for directorships, which are meant to 
facilitate compliance.145 The Australian Stock Exchange’s (ASX) 
corporate governance principles and recommendations (hereinafter 
referred to as ASX CGPR) introduced recommendations on board 
gender diversity in 2007 and 2010 and subsequently revised them in 
2014.146 
The ASX Listing Rules require that every ASX-listed company must 
provide a statement in its annual report regarding the extent to which 
the company has complied with the recommendations.147 The annual 
report must also explain where the recommendations have not been 
complied with, followed by an explanation for the noncompliance.148  
The ASX CGPR states that listed companies should “have a 
diversity policy which includes requirements for the board or a relevant 
committee of the board to set measurable objectives for achieving 
gender diversity and to assess annually both the objectives and the 
entity’s progress in achieving them.”149 The ASX CGPR suggests that, 
for the board, the “measurable objectives” might be in the form of 
numerical targets setting the percentage of women directors sought to 
be appointed.150 Further, the company must disclose the diversity 
145 Barnali Choudhury, Gender Diversity on Boards: Beyond Quotas, 26 EUR. BUS. L. 
REV. 229, 238–240 (2015). 
146 ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Australian Securities Exchange, 2nd ed. 2010); ASX CORP. 
COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Australian 
Securities Exchange, 3rd. ed. 2014), [hereinafter ASX CGPR 3rd. Ed.]. 
147 AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES EXCHANGE, Periodic Disclosure, ASX LISTING RULES 
409 r 4.10.3 (July 1, 2015), https://www.asx.com.au/documents/rules/Chapter04.pdf. 
148 Id.  
149 ASX CGPR 3rd. Ed., supra note 146 (Principle 1, Recommendation 1.5). 
150 Id. 
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policy annually along with the proportion of men and women on the 
board, in senior executive positions, and across the organization.151  
In terms of the rationale for the gender diversity measure, it is 
relevant to note that there is an emphasis on ensuring that the process 
of appointment for directors is formal and transparent, to promote 
investor confidence.152 In formalizing the process, the ASX CGPR 
mentions diversity as an aspect to consider for the nomination 
committee. In reviewing the recruitment process for a new director, the 
nomination committee would evaluate “the balance of skills, 
knowledge, experience, independence and diversity” on the board and, 
in light of this, prepare a description of the role and capabilities 
required for a particular appointment.153 Thus, diversity becomes an 
aspect built into the formal recruitment process. 
Additionally, companies are encouraged, on a voluntary basis, to 
introduce mentoring programs and flexible work entitlements for 
women in management to ensure that there are more women available 
in the pool of candidates considered. 
There have also been complementary efforts by the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors (AICD). Originally formed on the 
model of the United Kingdom’s Institute of Directors (IoD), the AICD 
consists of directors and senior leaders from business, government, and 
not-for-profit sectors.154 Since 2015, the AICD has released quarterly 
tracking reports on board gender diversity to measure Australian board 
progress.155 Apart from merely reporting diversity statistics, these 
reports contain interviews and opinion pieces to further facilitate the 
implementation of the diversity rules.156  
The AICD launched a mentoring program in 2010 that connects 
qualified, emerging female directors to mentors (chairs and 
experienced directors of ASX 200 companies) for a twelve-month 
151 Id. 
152 ASX CGPR 3rd. Ed., supra note 146 (Principle 2.1, 14). 
153 Id. 
154 For more information on the AICD, see Find Out More About Who We Are and What 
We Do, AUSTL. INST. CO. DIRS., http://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/about (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2018).  
155 Tracking Gender Diversity, AUSTL. INST. CO. DIRS., http://aicd.companydirectors. 
com.au/advocacy/board-diversity/tracking-gender-diversity (last visited Aug. 25, 2018). 
156 Id. 
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mentoring relationship.157 The program’s aim is for mentees to gain 
knowledge, skills, connections, and hopefully, board positions.158  
This is an important initiative considering that lack of mentors 
(along with gender bias and leadership style expectations) is one of the 
top challenges experienced by women executives.159 One of the 
advantages of mentoring programs is that qualified women are brought 
to the notice of board chairs and other senior board members. This is 
especially relevant because companies have cited the lack of 
availability of qualified women in the pool of candidates. Thus, 
mentoring programs provide an opportunity for women to gain entry 
(or at least a “toehold”) into what are currently mostly male 
networks.160 
While the mentoring program caters to qualified candidates, the 
AICD also has a scholarship program that provides training and support 
for women who wish to pursue careers as directors.161 It also introduced 
a program called “Board Ready,” which aims, as the title suggests, to 
get women ready for board positions in terms of giving them access to 
training and skill-building programs.162 
1. Rationale
The ASX CGPR very briefly mentions the rationale for the
introduction of gender diversity provisions. It cites studies that show a 
direct correlation between board gender diversity and financial 
performance. It also mentions that the promotion of gender diversity 
widens the pool of candidates considered for board positions. Finally, 
it states that promoting gender diversity could result in an enhanced 
157 Chair’s Mentoring Program 2015 Frequently Asked Questions, AUSTL. INST. CO. 
DIRS., http://www.companydirectors.com.au/~/media/resources/director-resource-centre/ 
governance-and-director-issues/board-diversity/board-diversity-pdf/2015-mentoring-
program/faq-mentoring-program.ashx (last visited Aug. 8, 2018). 
158 Id. 
159 Stefanie Balogh, What Women Think, THE AUSTRALIAN (Nov. 2016), 
https://specialreports.theaustralian.com.au/643389/18/.  
160 Choudhury, supra note 145, at 240.  
161 Press Release, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, AICD Scholarship 
Programme Expanded and More Targeted (June 8, 2014), https://ministers.pmc.gov.au/ 
cash/2014/aicd-scholarship-programme-expanded-and-more-targeted). 
162 Transitioning to the Boardroom, CO. DIRS. MAGAZINE (DEC. 2012), 
http://www.companydirectors.com.au/director-resource-centre/publications/company-
director-magazine/2012-back-editions/december/inside-your-institute-board-ready-
program-transitioning-to-the-boardroom. 
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reputation for the company, along with ensuring a closer connection 
with customers.163  
The amendments to the ASX CGPR in Australia were the result of a 
2009 report by the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 
(CAMAC) that was commissioned by the minister for superannuation 
and corporate law in 2008.164 The mandate of the report was to provide 
advice on options for creating an environment that would encourage 
companies to foster a governance culture that would embrace diversity 
on boards, especially gender diversity.165  
The CAMAC Report looked at the process of appointment of 
directors as a starting point of the study.166 Prior to the publication of 
the CAMAC Report, the second edition of the ASX CGPR was in 
place.167 It stated that the board should have a nomination committee 
to take care of the selection and appointment practices of the company, 
although the ultimate responsibility for this rested with the full 
board.168 In line with this, the CAMAC Report recommended that the 
ASX CGPR include “diversity” as a factor to be considered by the 
nomination committee in the selection process.169 This would 
“reinforc[e] the desirability of adopting an open approach to the 
identification of board candidates.”170 The ASX CGPR further stated 
that a formal and transparent selection process would promote investor 
confidence in the process.171 In this regard, the CAMAC Report 
recommended that the ASX CGPR explain the benefits of undertaking 
a structured selection process, including the use of consulting firms or 
databases of available candidates maintained by industry bodies and 
interest groups. This way, the search would be widened to a larger pool 
of candidates.172  
163 ASX CGPR 3rd Ed., supra note 146, at 11. 
164 CORPORATIONS & MARKETS ADVISORY COMMITTEE (CAMAC), DIVERSITY ON 
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 51 (2009), http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/by 
Headline/PDFFinal+Reports+2009/$file/Board_Diversity_B5.pdf [hereinafter CAMAC 
Report]. 
165 Id. at 31. 
166 Id.  
167 ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Australian Securities Exchange, 2nd ed. 2007) [hereinafter ASX 
CGPR, 2nd ed.].  
168 Id. at 2.418. 
169 CAMAC Report, supra note 164, at 37.  
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171 ASX CGPR, 2nd ed., supra note 167, at 18. 
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Despite shareholder approval being a necessary step in the board 
nomination process, the CAMAC Report noted that, in practice, the 
process is largely controlled by the board. Thus, the report asked 
whether shareholders might be better assisted by companies disclosing 
information about the processes leading up to the vote.173 According to 
the 2007 ASX CGPR, the shareholders, who had to ultimately elect the 
directors nominated by the nomination committee, were to be provided 
with information about each director regarding, among other things, 
their competencies, qualifications, independence, directorships held, 
relationships with the company or with directors of the company, and 
particulars of other positions held with significant time 
commitments.174 The 2008 amendments had further suggested that 
information about the procedure for selection and appointment of new 
directors and the reelection of incumbent directors, the board’s policy 
for nomination and appointment of directors, and details about the role 
and membership of the board’s nomination committee must be made 
available to shareholders.175  
The CAMAC Report recommended that the ASX CGPR require 
companies to include further information for shareholders, including 
the skills that the board was looking for in new appointments, the steps 
taken to ensure that a range of candidates were considered, whether 
professionals were consulted to identify and assess candidates, factors 
that were taken into account in the selection process, and a statement 
about why a particular person was nominated by the board.176 
One reason often cited for the lack of women directors being 
appointed is that there are not many women available with the required 
skills. The CAMAC Report cites a study interviewing the board chairs 
and directors of ASX 200 companies that found most respondent 
directors considered it a challenge to find board members with the 
appropriate industry experience.177 Since there is no clear stipulation of 
the requisite qualifications for a board member, the CAMAC Report 
takes note of a survey published in 2005 that indicated crucial factors 
for board appointments.178 The survey classifies these factors as 
“human capital” (what you know), which includes business knowledge, 
173 Id. at 15–16. 
174 Id. at 34–35. 
175 Id. at 36. 
176 Id. at 38. 
177 Id. at 39. 
178 Id. 
146 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 20, 113 
experience, performance, and skills; and “social capital” (whom you 
know), which includes business contacts often acquired through 
membership in formal or informal social networks.179 Since the most 
common way to attain these skills is through management roles, and 
not many women are involved in management positions, this 
contributes to the problem of lack of women directors.180 To overcome 
this problem, the CAMAC Report recommended establishing 
mentoring or other networking programs for women in management, 
along the lines of similar programs introduced in the United Kingdom, 
France, and Canada.181  
Also addressing the fact that there are still barriers to the 
advancement of women in senior managerial roles, the CAMAC 
Report recommends that companies voluntarily introduce flexibility in 
working arrangements and also ensure that promotion policies do not 
unfairly disadvantage women.182 Further, based on studies that have 
identified that women are more significantly involved in positions of 
control in the not-for-profit sector and in the public sector than in public 
listed companies, the CAMAC Report suggests that this could be one 
way of widening the pool of candidates in the selection process for 
board appointments.183 However, the report recognizes that people who 
do not have direct business experience might be discouraged from 
taking on board positions, especially in light of the strict obligations 
and liabilities that the law imposes on directors for breach of applicable 
laws.184 
Therefore, the CAMAC Report has tried addressing the lack of 
women directors problem at its root, i.e., by recommending the 
institution of a pipeline of women naturally progressing to management 
and board positions.  
II 
 GENDER INEQUALITY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
INEFFECTIVENESS: THE TWO PROBLEMS 
It is apparent from the divergent historical origins of the laws in 
Norway and the United States (the countries at two ends of the 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 39–40. 
181 Id. at 42–43. 
182 Id. at 43. 
183 Id. at 45. 
184 Id. at 45–46. 
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spectrum for gender diversity laws) that a different problem was at the 
heart of the regulations in each country. Norway’s concern for gender 
equality, especially after privatization, was the key to board gender 
quotas. In the United States, it was concern about corporate governance 
that motivated the diversity discussion. Norway’s law was focused on 
gender equality whereas the U.S. law has left it open for companies to 
define diversity, aiming for a broader diversity discourse. 
In Norway, the “business case” for board diversity seems to have 
been constructed later to make the law acceptable to businesses. When 
Laila Dåvøy in Norway articulates the business case for the gender 
quota, the language shifts from “representation” to “diversity” and she 
says: “I would not call this a gender quota reform. It is diversity we talk 
about, diversity in boardrooms.”185 According to her, diversity would 
ultimately be profitable to the company because it would improve 
strategic choice, enhance innovation, and speed up restructuring.186  
However, the problem with this rationale of profitability is twofold. 
The first issue is that the argument is mostly based on empirical studies 
that merely show correlation (between the increase in women directors 
and profitability of companies) rather than causation, i.e., the studies 
do not explain the factors that cause such an increase. The second issue, 
and the even bigger problem, is that many studies have contrary 
findings on this aspect.187 This is unsurprising because the board’s role 
in large companies is not directly linked to profit generation. Instead, 
any impact that the board has on company profits is through its role of 
corporate governance.188 
Norway’s articulation of the business case (i.e., women directors are 
profitable for companies), rather than the corporate governance 
arguments from the United States, have gained traction in other 
185 BJØRKHAUG & SØRENSEN, supra note 40, at 200. 
186 Id. 
187 There are many examples of studies supporting the business case. See Nancy Carter, 
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2008), CATALYST (2011), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/bottom-line-corporate-
performance-and-womens-representation-boards-20042008; J. N. Erhardt et. al., Board of 
Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance, 102 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L 
PERSPECTIVE 1111 (2013). There are examples of studies that do not support the business 
case. See Ovind Bohren & Oystein Strom, Governance and Politics: Regulating Indepen-
dence and Diversity in the Board Room, 37 J. BUS. FIN. AND ACCT. 1281 (2010); Renee B. 
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Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (2009).  
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jurisdictions. This is evident from the emphasis on gender diversity 
over other forms of diversity, even in countries like Australia and the 
United Kingdom, despite the corporate governance arguments made. 
For instance, the United Kingdom’s FRC talks only about board 
effectiveness.189 Yet, if this were the only motivation to encouraging 
diversity, then the focus should have been on all forms of diversity.  
In Australia, the ASX CGPR mentions that “the balance of skills, 
knowledge, experience, independence and diversity” on the board 
should be evaluated while deciding the profile of the candidate 
sought.190 The fact that diversity is mentioned as a separate quality from 
skills, knowledge, experience, and independence suggests that the 
emphasis is solely on demographic diversity, i.e., race, gender, and, 
perhaps, age and nationality. Further, the ASX CGPR states that the 
diversity policy is required to set measurable objectives for gender 
diversity, and there is no such requirement for any other type of 
diversity.191 Similarly, although the United States’ focus was diversity 
of all types, including that of viewpoint, recently diversity is 
understood in a very limited way based on the international 
discourse.192 
The above review of gender diversity law and regulations across the 
four jurisdictions studied therefore shows a conflation of two distinct 
problems. The first problem is the lack of women in the highest 
corporate positions, and the second problem is the need to strengthen 
board effectiveness. Because of this conflation, neither problem is 
individually understood or assessed accurately.  
Regulations specifically designed to address the issue of board 
effectiveness would focus on diversity broadly because various forms 
of diversity might bring diverse perspectives to the board, and hence, 
strengthen decision-making. Further, board members coming from 
diverse backgrounds might be more willing to challenge the majority 
thinking on an issue.193 Focusing on gender diversity alone will not be 
the most optimal solution if board effectiveness is the problem 
addressed by these regulations.194  
189 THE CODE 2014, supra note 140, at 2. 
190 ASX CGPR 3rd. Ed., supra note 146 (Principle 2.1). 
191 Id. at Principle 1, Recommendation 1.5. 
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The other issue is the glass ceiling for women in the workplace and, 
consequently, the underrepresentation of women on company boards. 
Regulations specifically designed to address this problem would find 
and address the reasons for women not progressing up the corporate 
ladder, rather than merely mandating (or encouraging) that a certain 
percentage of the board be composed of women. 
If women are entering the workforce in equal numbers but not 
advancing to the top into board positions, then there is obviously an 
issue that needs to be investigated. The board diversity discourse has 
focused, regarding this glass ceiling problem, on the practice of boards 
not looking beyond their own networks, and therefore overlooking 
women and minorities who do not have access to such networks. For 
instance, the United Kingdom’s Higgs Review found that women are 
discriminated against by recruitment committees that often do not look 
beyond CEOs and senior executives when making board appointments. 
As a solution, the Higgs Review recommends looking at other sectors 
like academia and NGOs.195 However, the review does not attempt to 
investigate why there are not enough women CEOs and senior 
executives. In Australia, the CAMAC Report suggests that flexible 
work arrangements and promotion practices that do not discriminate 
against women must be voluntarily adopted by companies to ensure 
that women are retained in the pipeline.196 However, this suggestion is 
not reflected in the disclosure regime.  
It must be noted that the ASX CGPR requires companies to disclose 
the proportion of men and women not only in the board and executive 
rungs but also in the entire workforce.197 Although this aspect has not 
received as much attention in the public narrative of corporate 
diversity, it is significant for the glass ceiling problem. Although it was 
not reflected in the U.K. Corporate Governance Code, a similar 
recommendation was made by the Davies Report in the United 
Kingdom.198 Disclosures at various levels leading up to management 
positions would help investors and companies themselves track the 
points at which the gender balance starts to skew. The disclosure would 
allow us to ask further questions about the reasons for skewed gender 
balance at certain levels. Such metrics and reasons might differ across 
companies and sectors. For instance, certain sectors like IT might have 
195 HIGGS REVIEW, supra note 93, at 10.25–10.32. 
196 CAMAC Report, supra note 164, at 43. 
197 ASX CGPR 3rd. Ed., supra note 146, at Principle 1, Recommendation 1.5. 
198 DAVIES REPORT, supra note 85, at 19. 
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a skewed gender balance even in entry-level positions. Data regarding 
such metrics and differences across sectors will help us design more 
optimal solutions.  
A deeper analysis of the glass ceiling problem is possible if the 
discussion is not restricted to company boards but is instead broadened 
to the entire workforce. This allows us to ask pertinent questions about 
the reasons for women dropping out of the workforce. As the next 
section will discuss, factors like family obligations, hostile work 
environments, discriminatory promotion metrics, or a combination of 
such factors might be relevant. The 2017 allegations of sexual 
harassment by a former employee of Uber, and the results of the 
subsequent investigation, might provide guidance in this regard. The 
next section will examine these factors and possible solutions based on 
the recommendations made to Uber by former Attorney General Eric 
Holder’s law firm.  
III 
GENDER DIVERSITY IN THE WORKPLACE: THE UBER STORY 
As Part 2 explained, the corporate gender diversity laws have, with 
the exception of Australia, focused on the board of directors. 
Committee reports in some countries have offered possible solutions, 
such as looking beyond the CEO pool to find suitable women 
candidates for board positions.199 Another solution was to look at the 
level just below the CEO pool while filling board positions.200 This 
phenomenon of women dropping out of the workforce as they climb 
higher up the corporate ladder is referred to as the “leaking pipeline.”201 
The alleged events that transpired at Uber, and the subsequent report 
issued by the Holder Committee, helps shed light on relevant factors 
responsible for the leaking pipeline and on best practices that 
companies might adopt to address these issues.  
Uber’s board unanimously adopted the Holder Committee Report. 
Subsequently, an employee meeting was held on June 13, 2017, to 
199 TYSON REPORT, supra note 100, at 12–13. 
200 Janice Reals Ellig, Women Board Candidates: Going Beyond the CEO Title, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/women-board-
candidates-going-beyond-the-ceo-title_us_5a1c646ae4b073f567840a0b. 
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discuss the recommendations.202 That same day, then CEO Travis 
Kalanick wrote an email to Uber staff announcing that he would take 
an indefinite leave of absence to work on “Travis 2.0” because Uber 
was going to transform into “Uber 2.0.”203 This was followed up by 
Kalanick announcing his resignation from Uber.204 Apart from helping 
Uber transform into Uber 2.0, the report offers important lessons about 
the causes of the leaking pipeline in companies generally, and potential 
solutions that might help us to move toward Corporate Diversity 2.0 or, 
in other words, a more effective diversity regime. This section will 
recount the events at Uber based on a former employee’s allegations, 
some counterviews to the allegations, and the relevant 
recommendations of the Holder Committee Report.  
A. Allegations Regarding Sexual Harassment and Toxic Culture at
Uber
The Holder Committee Report was adopted by Uber after a series of
events that occurred after a former employee, Susan Fowler, published 
a blog post entitled “Reflecting on one, very, very, strange year at 
Uber.”205 In this blog post, she made allegations of sexual harassment 
faced by her and other women at Uber, sexism in general, and what she 
described as problematic work culture.  
Ms. Fowler’s allegations, with respect to sexual harassment, are as 
follows: she alleged that her manager propositioned her on her first day 
on the team and that human resources (HR), and senior management 
said they would not do more than issue a warning because it was his 
first offense and he was a high performer with “stellar reviews.” She 
was then given the option of moving to another team or staying on the 
same team with the possibility of getting a negative review from the 
manager in question. Allegedly, an HR representative told Ms. Fowler 
202 Heather Somerville & Joseph Menn, Uber Board Adopts All Recommendations from 
Eric Holder Investigation, REUTERS (June 12, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/uber-
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0613-story.html. 
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that if she did make the latter choice and received a negative 
performance review, it would not amount to retaliation because she was 
given the choice to move to another team.206 
Fowler then details how she spoke to other women engineers and 
found that others had had similar experiences with the same manager. 
Fowler notes that these conversations revealed that what happened with 
her was not the first instance of such behavior by the manager. The 
manager in question eventually left the company, although Fowler 
alleges in her blog post that he might have been fired.207 If Fowler’s 
statement regarding this issue is true, it speaks not only to harassment 
but also to the company’s failure to redress the issue. 
Next, Fowler speaks to the rampant sexism at Uber by giving an 
example of leather jackets ordered for all the employees. The number 
of women engineers at Uber had dwindled to six, and management sent 
an email to them that although the male engineers would be getting 
leather jackets, it had been decided that there would be no jackets for 
women because the low number did not enable the company to get a 
discount as they had got on the jackets for men. After some back and 
forth between the management, Fowler eventually received an email 
that said if “women really wanted equality, then we should realize we 
were getting equality by not getting the leather jackets.”208 When the 
email thread was ultimately forwarded to HR, Fowler was asked to 
consider if she, herself, might be the problem because she had been the 
common factor in her many complaints to HR.209  
Fowler says that the HR executive then asked her details of email 
addresses and chat rooms that she and other female engineers at Uber 
used to chat. Additionally, when Fowler noted the low percentage of 
Uber women engineers, she was told that, on average, women and 
minorities were better suited for certain types of jobs. Finally, Fowler 
says she was “berated” for keeping an email record of things. Further, 
Fowler’s team manager summoned her to have a “difficult 
conversation” and threatened to fire her if she repeated such behavior. 
Fowler reported this threat to a higher-up in the organization, and also 
human resources (HR), both of whom agreed that the threat was illegal, 
but no action was taken against the manager who, according to Fowler, 
was a “high performer.” A week after this, Fowler took a job with 
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another company.210 Again, if these allegations are true, it reflects the 
company’s failure to provide redress to Fowler against actions that 
contribute to creating a hostile work environment for women. 
Regarding the problematic work culture, Fowler alleges that when 
she wanted to transfer out of the team her transfer was blocked because 
of “performance issues” even though she had very good performance 
scores. Allegedly, she was told that “performance problems aren’t 
always something that has to do with work, but sometimes can be about 
things outside of work or your personal life.”211 Fowler even talked 
about how her performance review was later changed after the fact to 
reflect a lower score, and she was only informed of this when she 
reapplied for a transfer.  
This lower score suddenly made her ineligible for a graduate 
computer science program at Stanford, one in which she had already 
enrolled. Fowler explains later that this lowering of her score, which 
prevented her transfer out of the team, could be because having her on 
the team made her manager look good. She says she heard her manager 
boast that “even though the rest of the teams were losing their women 
engineers left and right, he still had some on his team.”212 Finally, 
Fowler ends her blog by noting that she was thankful to have worked 
with some of the best engineers and that she was proud of the work she 
did at Uber.213  
Following Fowler’s blog post, the New York Times reported that “at 
least two people” had reported instances of sexual harassment to the 
chief technology officer (CTO), Thuan Pham, and one of them had 
even emailed Kalanick.214 The same article also mentions a company 
meeting in late 2015 where a manager groped several female 
employees.215 It also reported that the manager was terminated within 
twelve hours.216 A month later, another article by the same newspaper 
reported that an Uber manager had thrown a coffee mug at a 
subordinate in a fit of rage and that no action was taken against the 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Mike Isaac, Inside Uber’s Aggressive Unrestrained Workplace Culture, N.Y. TIMES 
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manager because the particular city that the manager was in charge of 
was doing well.217 All of these reports suggest that the company 
avoided taking action against high performers.  
Fowler’s blog post and the reactions it generated led to a public 
relations scandal, with Kalanick ultimately being asked to step down 
from his position as CEO. There were other problems, including 
lawsuits that Uber was already contending with, but the attention 
generated by Fowler’s post catalyzed Kalanick’s resignation. As one 
journalist wrote, “Travis Kalanick’s fate was sealed the moment Susan 
Fowler hit ‘publish.’”218 However, the resignation of the CEO of a 
company is unlikely to cure systemic issues like the ones described in 
Fowler’s blog post. The Holder Committee Report’s recommendations 
are more helpful for companies looking to incorporate best practices 
that would prevent such issues from arising. Before looking at the 
Holder Committee Report’s recommendations, however, it is worth 
looking at counter viewpoints about Uber’s work culture rather than 
solely relying entirely on Fowler’s account.  
B. The Counter View on Uber’s Work Culture
While many blamed Uber’s work culture for fostering the 
environment that Fowler’s blog post sketched out, there were also 
positive accounts of Uber’s work culture. One example is Margaret-
Ann Seger, a female employee at Uber who had previously worked at 
Facebook. Seger recounts that she felt much more comfortable in the 
competitive environment fostered inside Uber. She is quoted as having 
posted the following: “I left Facebook because I was told that I was too 
aggressive. Pushing too hard, wanting to move too fast. . . . Coming to 
Uber was like a homecoming. I could be who I truly am, without being 
labelled an ‘aggressive’ woman.”219 Her blog post raises the point that 
an aggressive and competitive work culture is not always antithetical 
to female employees. This experience is particularly important because 
217 Mike Isaac, Uber’s CEO Plays with Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-and-himself-to-the-
precipice.html? _r=0. 
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much has been made of Uber’s “hustle culture,” despite the fact that 
most start-ups are known to have a demanding work environment. 
Long before Fowler’s blog post was published, another former Uber 
employee, Melanie Curtin, who had worked as community manager in 
2013, had written a balanced account of her experience at Uber.220 She 
lists Uber’s positive aspects as being able to work with smart and hard-
working people, and that the company is performance driven and 
sustains a flat meritocracy environment where anyone’s ideas could be 
heard. On the negative side, Curtin lists work stress, the fact that 
systems were not yet in place, and the lack of work-life balance.221 
Thus, these two women’s views present counter narratives to that of 
Fowler’s, showing that Fowler’s experiences may have spoken only to 
a particular group of people or certain teams within Uber rather than 
the entire company. 
However, Fowler’s blog post did raise serious questions regarding 
HR’s response(s) to sexual harassment complaints. A month after 
Fowler’s post was published, Steve Tobek wrote that high-performance 
cultures are not necessarily bad and that a similar negative picture had 
been painted of Amazon.222 Tobek was pointing out that meritocracy, 
which he defined as “a system in which the talented are chosen and 
moved ahead on the basis of their achievement,” alone does not signify 
a bad work culture.223 Meritocracy, however, should not mean that the 
company ignores bad behavior when it comes from high-performing 
employees. Tobek notes that bias and favoritism, employees who push 
too hard, and HR executives who look the other way when high 
performers behave badly, are all unfortunately prevalent in almost 
every organization.224 He quotes Jeff Bezos, the founder and CEO of 
Amazon, that a company cannot survive unless such behavior is 
isolated.225 The solution, then, is to recognize these issues as systemic 
and to have standards in place to deal appropriately with those 
responsible for such conduct rather than blaming one company’s work 
220 See generally Melanie Curtin, What It’s Really Like Working for Uber, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melanie-curtin/what-its-really-like-
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culture, or its CEO, or merely increasing the number of women on its 
board. 
Further, Uber attempted to improve gender equality within the 
company in other ways. A 2016 Women in Technology event article 
speaks of Uber’s legal counsel Salle Yoo’s passion for equal pay across 
genders.226 The article states that Yoo is known for “asking HR to rerun 
offer letters if she doesn’t think it represents equal pay,” and that she 
hired female leaders for her teams.227 In 2014, she founded #LadyEng, 
an internal organization, to improve the recruitment process, career 
opportunities, and work environment for women engineers and women 
in other technical roles.228 
Kalanick informed the company that women held 15.1% of Uber’s 
engineering, product management, and scientist roles, and those 
numbers had not changed substantially over the previous year (when 
the incidents in Fowler’s blog post are situated). He also noted that 
Twitter, Facebook, and Google reported having 10%, 17%, and 18% 
female workplace participation respectively, implying that Uber’s 
gender diversity ratio was not drastically different from that of other 
tech companies.229 Due to Uber’s similarity to many other companies, 
we would do well to draw lessons from the investigative report 
commissioned by Uber and incorporate those lessons into the corporate 
diversity discourse and practice. 
C. The Holder Committee Report
A day after Fowler published her blog post, Kalanick told employees 
that he had hired former Attorney General Eric Holder and his 
associate, Tammy Albarrán, at the law firm Covington & Burling to 
“conduct an independent review into the specific issues relating to the 
workplace environment raised by Susan Fowler, as well as diversity 
and inclusion at Uber more broadly.”230 Kalanick also informed them 
226 Sarah Shull, Corporate Culture Lessons from Uber, SUMTOTAL SYSTEMS (Sept. 22, 
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that Arianna Huffington, a board member, and Liane Hornsey, the chief 
human resources officer, would also be aiding the investigation.231 
Uber’s special committee board specifically instructed Covington & 
Burling to deal with three issues: 
(1) Uber’s workplace environment as it related to the allegations of
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in Ms. Fowler’s post; 
(2) whether the company’s policies and practices were sufficient to
prevent and properly address discrimination, harassment, and 
retaliation in the workplace; and 
(3) what steps Uber could take to ensure that its commitment to a
diverse and inclusive workplace was reflected not only in the 
company’s policies, but made real in the experiences of each of Uber’s 
employees.232 
The Holder Report’s recommendations concern themselves not just 
with diversity but also with inclusion and then lays out guidelines to 
achieving such objectives. At the outset, the Holder Report states that 
“diversity is generally viewed as focusing on the presence of diverse 
employees based on religion, race, age, sexual orientation, gender, and 
culture.”233 The report also highlights the importance of inclusion and 
retention policies to complement diversity efforts. The report’s relevant 
best practices for all organizations are detailed next. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the recommendations are 
broadly classified under four sections: (1) board oversight; (2) training; 
(3) diversity, inclusion and retention “enhancement” policies; and (4)
harassment, discrimination, and employee relations.
1. Board Oversight
To give effect to diversity policies, the report makes the issue
relevant at the board and senior management levels. The report 
recommends that the board create an Ethics and Culture Committee to 
231 Id. 
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oversee issues pertaining to diversity, inclusion, and ethical business 
practices.234 This committee would oversee senior management 
responsible for ethics, compliance, human resources, and risk.235 The 
committee could introduce metrics to establish and monitor compliance 
with Uber’s values regarding diversity and inclusion.236 To ensure 
accountability, the committee recommends tying these metrics to the 
compensation of senior management.237 The Holder Report 
recommends that a member of the senior management team be 
responsible for giving effect to this committee’s recommendations.238 
Additionally, the report recommends that Uber’s Audit Committee 
oversee the company’s compliance efforts to ensure that significant 
compliance and harassment issues could be brought to the Audit 
Committee without going through the CEO.239 When necessary, the 
Audit Committee could oversee the response to such issues, including 
any potential investigations.240 This recommendation is significant 
because it brings harassment issues under the purview of the Audit 
Committee (which is responsible for overseeing financial reporting 
process, internal controls, and compliance with laws and regulations). 
The recent coverage of harassment claims against powerful people in 
the #metoo movement makes this a high-priority issue. Therefore, it is 
pertinent to make the Audit Committee ultimately responsible for such 
issues. 
To further ensure that responses to harassment issues are adequate, 
both at the level of human resources and higher up the reporting line 
(all the way to the Audit Committee), the Holder Report recommends 
that software can be used to track such complaints to record repeat 
offenders and respond appropriately.241 Again, the use of technology in 
this regard is an important suggestion that will ensure a company’s 
ability to address problems before they escalate. 
2. Training at All Levels
The Holder Report recommends training for leadership,
management, human resources, and other employees with respect to 
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conducting interviews and handling of complaints regarding 
harassment, discrimination, and retaliation.242 The report recommends 
that Uber’s senior leaders receive mandatory leadership coaching and 
that Uber’s first-time managers receive significant training.243 This 
training is meant to ensure inclusive leadership, combat implicit bias, 
and encourage a culture of openness where employees feel comfortable 
proposing different ideas.244 Further, these aspects should be 
incorporated into the competency metrics for senior leadership to be 
used during annual performance reviews.245 
Human Resources personnel, the first point of contact for reported 
harassment-related complaints, must be adequately trained. The Holder 
Report recommends that the training for HR personnel should include 
proper investigation of complaints regarding harassment, 
discrimination, and/or retaliation followed by appropriate 
documentation of such complaints and investigations.246 
Most importantly, the report recommends that personnel should be 
trained to identify when incidents should be escalated to the company’s 
legal team.247 The report envisages training programs for managers and 
HR personnel to recognize legal issues and escalate them where 
necessary. On the other hand, leadership training focuses on oversight 
of management and HR with respect to handling of such issues. 
The complaints process could be strengthened by creating multiple 
avenues for such complaints to give employees alternative options in 
case they fear retaliation through any one avenue.248 Examples of such 
avenues could be reporting to the immediate manager and to HR. 
Again, the report recommends that protocols for escalating and 
tracking complaints are set for both HR personnel and managers.249 
To address diversity and inclusion at the interview stage, the report 
recommends training all employees involved in conducting interviews 
to conduct inclusive interviews and to be aware of unconscious bias. 
The aim of such training is to standardize the interview process with 
respect to questions asked, evaluation of the candidate, and provision 
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feedback.250 This kind of standardization helps interview panels rate 
candidates according to preset standards without succumbing to 
unconscious bias. 
Finally, because Uber already had a head of diversity (Bernard 
Coleman) at the time of the Holder Report’s writing, the report 
recommended that his role should be elevated. This elevation would 
make him more visible, allowing him to serve as a resource on issues 
of diversity and inclusion to both senior management and rank-and-file 
employees.251 
3. Diversity, Inclusion, and Retention Enhancements and Policies
The Holder Report recommends enhancements to diversity and
inclusion that go well beyond what current gender diversity laws seek 
to achieve.  
As many disclosure laws require, the report suggests that Uber 
publish its diversity statistics for the entire company.252 Additionally, 
the Holder Report recommends that the company publish how it 
intends to increase diversity each year. It is also significant to note that 
the report does not restrict the requirement to gender but rather 
mentions diversity in terms of “under-represented populations.”253 
Further, the report suggests that the company set up an “employee 
diversity advisory board” to ensure consistency of diversity efforts 
across the company and also to funnel employee feedback in this regard 
to the head of diversity.254 Employee feedback on diversity policies and 
their implementation is to be solicited through annual anonymous 
surveys and focus groups conducted via reputable consultants, with the 
results made available to the company.255 For example, in a situation 
wherein employees want to communicate their views about diversity 
policies, there would be a channel to do so.  
Finally, the report recommends that the head of diversity should 
publicize initiatives, accomplishments, and areas still needing 
improvement.256 It can be inferred that such publicity would make 
employees aware of initiatives and allow them to provide appropriate 
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feedback to help the company frame and implement improvements 
appropriately. 
With these broad recommendations on diversity disclosures, and 
feedback as the framework, the final section of the report then goes on 
to present some interesting ways in which to achieve diversity. To 
overcome the “pool problem,” the report recommends that the 
company build deeper partnerships with “Historically Black Colleges 
and Universities and Hispanic-Serving Institutions.”257  
Next, to overcome the problem of implicit bias, the report 
recommends adopting blind resume review, a process whereby the 
selection panel reviews resumes without knowledge of the candidate’s 
gender, ethnic background, name, or personal information.258 Where 
possible, the report recommends that the company use blind review in 
exercises during the selection process for technical and engineering 
roles.259 A complementary policy to the suggested blind review is to 
adopt a version of the “Rooney Rule” that requires at least a small 
percentage of women and other minority candidates to be included in 
the pool of candidates considered for each position.260  
In addition to the Rooney Rule, the report recommends that one 
woman and/or minority person serves on the interview panel for each 
applicant to ensure diverse perspectives in the feedback and evaluation 
of candidates.261 In addition to the above, the report recommends that 
the company review all its written communications, including job 
descriptions and evaluations, for bias.262 Further, the report states that 
diversity efforts across company teams must be coordinated to ensure 
consistency and legal review of such efforts.263 The report also 
recommends incentivizing diversity efforts by recognizing successful 
diversity efforts of managers and using their skills and techniques as a 
platform for other company teams.264  
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The report has also suggested the adoption of a “sponsorship” 
program, similar to the mentorship program promoted in Australia at 
the board and management levels, as a way to promote diversity 
enhancement and retention.265 The Holder Report recommends this 
program for the mid-management level and opines that sponsorship 
programs “positively impact pay, retention, ambition and career 
advancement.”266 This recommendation speaks to the problem of 
women and minority persons not having the required networks and role 
models in the workplace. The report explains that for such a program 
to be successful, both sponsors and protégés would need to be educated 
about the program.267 The report also explains that it would be more 
meaningful to let sponsors pick protégés from a pool of candidates 
identified for retention by the company rather than randomly assigning 
sponsors and protégés.268 To further ensure the sponsor’s active 
participation in the program, the report suggests that the company 
regularly review such programs and incorporate the results into the 
annual performance assessment metrics of the sponsor.269  
In support of employee retention, the performance review process 
should be fair, transparent, and objective. Expected benchmarks should 
be made clear, and feedback should be continuous to ensure that 
employees are aware of the company’s expectations.270 Also, the report 
recommends introducing self-nomination and peer-manager 
nominations to an independent committee, along with a blind review 
process, to eliminate subjectivity in the performance review process.271 
Additionally, the report suggests that the company review employee 
benefits in order to ensure that a more diverse workforce is attracted 
and retained.272 For example, a parental leave policy that does not 
discriminate between genders or between parents with biological 
children and those with adopted children.273 Another example is having 
policies regarding “off-ramping” and “on-ramping” an employee 
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before and after parental leave to ensure consistent and fair 
treatment.274  
The report also recommends adopting flexible work schedules and 
remote work to ensure that employees with children, and those from a 
wider geographical pool, can be attracted and retained.275 Another 
suggested measure is that the regularly catered dinners at Uber be 
offered earlier in the day to signify an earlier end to the work day so 
that more employees can avail themselves of this benefit.276 This 
suggestion speaks to the unwritten requirement in most companies that 
employees have to work at the office until late, which often leads to 
many women with children choosing to exit the workforce. To further 
ensure that specific issues that lead to employees leaving the company 
are identified, the report recommends that companies conduct exit 
interviews with neutral third parties, like consultants or HR personnel, 
and internal surveys.277 Thus, the company can then address those 
issues that are identified.  
4. Harassment, Discrimination, and Employee Relations
The Holder Report makes more specific recommendations that
speak directly to Fowler’s allegations. Some of the recommendations 
serve as a cautionary tale for other companies. With respect to 
harassment and discrimination, the report states that Uber should adopt 
a zero-tolerance policy for substantiated complaints of harassment and 
discrimination against employees even if they are high-performing 
employees.278 Further, the report recommends that the company apply 
all policies evenly without giving any special treatment based on level, 
tenure, or past performance of the employee.279 
Regarding employee relations, the recommendations state that clear 
guidance regarding appropriate workplace relationships must be 
developed. This guidance would make it clear that any type of romantic 
or intimate relationship between individuals in a reporting relationship 
is prohibited.280 Also, the report recommends that barriers for 
employees to transfer to another team within the company must be 
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removed and not be tied to performance.281 The report goes on to 
specify that an HR staff person review transfer requests and decisions 
to evaluate if such requests are a result of hostile or divisive 
environments and if they are being blocked for improper reasons.282 
Similar to the suggestion regarding tracking harassment complaints, 
the report also suggests tracking transfer requests to identify patterns 
and underlying problems.283 
With respect to work culture generally, the report recommended that 
the company adopt clear guidelines regarding alcohol consumption and 
the use of controlled substances.284 To facilitate inclusion, the report 
recommended that the company support work events where alcohol is 
not a strong component in order to enable employees who do not 
consume alcohol to network and engage in team-building activities.285 
While some of the recommendations might not be feasible for all 
companies, especially smaller start-ups, the Holder Report broadly 
offers good guidance to companies seeking to bolster themselves 
against similar sexual harassment complaints and consequential public 
relations issues and possible shareholder actions. As the next section 
shows, shareholders have started to engage with companies more 
actively on such issues, and it is important that boards are able to 
implement an appropriate diversity framework. 
IV 
CORPORATE DIVERSITY 2.0: THE WAY FORWARD 
Part 2 identified two distinct problems that diversity regulations 
attempt to address: (1) the lack of diversity at the board level impeding 
effective board functioning, i.e., the board effectiveness issue; and (2) 
the lack of equality in the workplace that prevents women and racial 
minorities from naturally progressing to top management levels, i.e., 
the glass ceiling issue. Since the regulations in most countries have 
conflated the two issues, the regulations focus on increasing the number 
of women directors while overlooking other types of diversity that 
might be useful on the board and at other levels in the workforce. 
Recently, issues of harassment and discrimination (like those detailed 
in Part 3) have brought poor diversity and inclusion practices into the 
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spotlight, and the existing regulations do not provide guidance on these 
issues. This further emphasizes the need for diversity regulations and 
company policies to address the second issue, i.e., workplace equality. 
This section will first discuss the need for boards to prioritize issues 
of diversity as part of their fiduciary obligations. Next, it will lay out 
“Corporate Diversity 2.0” or an action plan for diversity regulations 
and best practices for companies across the globe.  
A. The Need for Corporate Diversity 2.0: Shareholder Activism and
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties
Many other companies have been at the receiving end of similar
allegations to those that led Uber to adopt the Holder Committee Report 
in 2017.286 Investor groups have begun to ask for more than superficial 
diversity policies at the board level, even claiming that directors and 
officers have a fiduciary duty to redress hostile work environment 
situations. 
A recent letter by CtW Investment Group to Amazon’s CEO, Jeff 
Bezos, expresses concern that Amazon has not acted for at least two 
years after a credible report of “harassing behavior” by Mr. Price, the 
former chief of Amazon Studios, became known to the company.287 
The letter then links this concern to the “lack of diversity in its senior 
executive ranks” and “shortcomings of its human capital management 
policies,” making the Holder Committee recommendations relevant.288 
The letter goes on to list a few recommendations to the board that echo 
some of the Holder Committee’s recommendations. It urges Amazon’s 
board to commit to gender parity on the board and to set targets for 
increasing diversity among its senior executives.289  
Next, the letter asks the board to create a “Stakeholder Advisory 
Council” that would focus on sustainability issues, including 
promoting gender diversity and preventing sexual harassment. Further, 
the members of the Stakeholder Advisory Council should regularly 
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16432526/harvey-weinstein-allegations-whos-involved.  
287 Letter from Dieter Waizenegger, Executive Director of CtW Inv. Grp., to Jeff Bezos, 
Chairman and CEO of Amazon.com, Inc. (Nov. 30, 2017) (letter available at http://ctw 
investmentgroup.com/) [hereinafter, Shareholder Letter to Amazon]. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
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meet with the board and senior management.290 These requirements 
echo the sentiment of the Holder Committee Report, which 
recommends that the Ethics and Culture Committee address such issues 
and bring those issues under the board’s oversight. Further, the letter 
recommends that the board retain an independent expert in labor law to 
review all employment agreements of the company to ensure that 
employees are not inhibited from reporting, discussing, or litigating 
issues of harassment, unfair treatment, and/or inappropriate conduct.291 
Finally, the letter recommends that Amazon’s “affinity groups”292 
be given more authority and independence so that employees can use 
these groups as an alternate channel to raise concerns over harassment, 
echoing the Holder Committee Report.293 The authority of such groups 
should extend to seeking external arbitration where management fails 
to address issues.294 The letter concludes by stating that a separate 
shareholder advisory resolution to the same effect will be submitted by 
the investment group and asks for the board’s support for the 
proposal.295  
Notably, the letter mentions that the “gender diversity gap” poses 
significant risks for long-term shareholders.296 Shareholders have 
begun recognizing that diversity and associated issues are linked to 
shareholder value in the long term. Also significant, the letter combines 
the issue of diversity at the board and senior management levels with 
the prevention of sexual harassment. However, the letter does not go as 
far as the Holder Committee Report, which explains that a commitment 
to diversity, inclusion, and retention at all levels will help address 
issues of sexual harassment and hostile work conditions for women and 
minorities.  
Interestingly, CtW’s letter to Amazon was preceded by a derivative 
action filed against Twenty First Century Fox Inc. (21CF) with similar 
claims, i.e., that the company had not taken steps to address sexual 
harassment and racial discrimination. The action alleged that directors, 
officers, and the controlling shareholder were in breach of their 
290 Id.  
291 Id.  
292 Groups like Asians@Amazon and Women in Engineering are meant to help Amazon 
focus its diversity efforts. See Diversity at Amazon, AMAZON.COM, https://www.amazon. 
com/b?ie=UTF8&node=10080092011#affinity-groups (last visited Sept. 14, 2018). 
293 Shareholder Letter to Amazon, supra note 287. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. at 4. 
296 Id. 
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fiduciary duties for, amongst other things, failing to redress the hostile 
work environment.297  
21CF eventually entered into a $90 million settlement, along with 
an agreement to undertake governance reforms.298 More specifically, 
the governance reform was in the form of establishing a Fox News 
Workplace Professionalism and Inclusion Council composed of 
“experts in workplace and inclusion matters.”299 The brief for the 
council is to “ensure a proper workplace environment for all employees 
and guests, strengthen reporting practices for wrongdoing, enhance HR 
training on workplace behavior, and further recruitment and 
advancement of women and minorities.”300 This setup of the committee 
and the committee’s tasks echo the recommendations by the Holder 
Committee to Uber. Further, the Council is to report directly to the 
board of 21CF, thus making the board ultimately responsible for these 
issues.301 This is again reminiscent of the Holder Committee’s 
recommendation for Uber’s board to set up an Ethics and Culture 
Committee to ensure that the board oversees issues of diversity and 
inclusion.302 
This derivative action shows that company boards are vulnerable to 
such actions where they do not identify and address issues of 
harassment, racial and gender discrimination, and a hostile work 
environment.303 One of the claims alleged that the directors and officers 
were in breach of their fiduciary duties. With respect to the board of 
directors, the complaint alleged that the directors owed “the highest 
obligation of good faith and loyalty” in the administration of the 
297 Verified Derivative Complaint, City of Monroe Emps.’ Ret. Sys., derivatively on 
behalf of ex rel. Twenty-First Century Fox Inc. v. Rupert Murdoch and Ors., No. 2017-0833 
(Del. Ch. filed Nov 20,2017), https://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00318/_res/id=Attachments/ 
index=1/2017-11-20%20(EFILED)%20Stipulation%20of%20Settlement.pdf [hereinafter 
The Derivative Action]. 
298 Company Press Release, 21st Century Fox, 21st Century Fox Establishes the Fox 
News Workplace Professionalism and Inclusion Council (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www. 
21cf.com/news/21st-century-fox/2017/21st-century-fox-establishes-fox-news-workplace-
professionalism-and. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 The Holder Report, supra note 232, at 2. 
303 Kevin LaCroix, Massive Derivative Suit Settlement for Alleged Management Failure 
to Prevent Sexual Misconduct, THE D & O DIARY (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.dandodiary. 
com/2017/11/articles/shareholders-derivative-litigation/massive-derivative-suit-settlement-
alleged-management-failure-prevent-sexual-misconduct/. 
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company, including the company’s compliance with laws and its duty 
to “conduct a good faith investigation into known violations of laws, 
regulations, and internal policies concerning sexual harassment and 
discrimination.”304  
Two specific allegations were made within this claim against the 
board. The first allegation was that the directors breached their 
fiduciary duties “by permitting a hostile work environment, which 
included rampant sexual harassment and exploitation, racial 
discrimination, and retaliation to continue unabated for more than a 
decade.”305 The second allegation was that the board breached its 
fiduciary duties by “allowing senior management to control the flow of 
information relating to the investigation into sexual harassment at Fox 
News and the negotiation of Ailes’s separation agreement.”306 These 
claims implicate the board’s failure to adequately oversee the 
investigation of the sexual harassment allegations and monitor senior 
management. In terms of damages, the complaint alleged that the 
board’s breach of fiduciary duties caused, and continued to cause, 
damage to the company’s finances, image, and goodwill.307 
The derivative action against 21CF, and resulting settlement, show 
that issues of workplace harassment, discrimination, and retaliation 
pose a significant risk to the company, and boards will now have to 
prioritize and address the issue more actively. So far, this has not been 
an issue discussed by company boards.308  
A recent survey of more than 400 respondents who held positions in 
both private and public company boards in the United States found that 
the majority of company boards have not discussed sexual harassment 
and gender discrimination issues at all.309 Further, the survey found that 
304 The Derivative Action, supra note 297, at ¶ 20666. 
305 Id. at ¶ 20767.  
306 Id. 
307 Id. at ¶ 208. 
308 Although the 21st Century Fox Derivative Action was settled before the court could 
decide on it, commentators have already pointed to the duties of care and loyalty becoming 
a relevant issue in sexual harassment cases. See Elliot Grund, Using the Duty of Loyalty as 
a Vehicle for Change in Sexual Misconduct Cases, THE COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. BLOG 
ONLINE (Nov. 27, 2017), https://cblr.columbia.edu/using-the-duty-of-loyalty-as-a-vehicle-
for-change-in-sexual-misconduct-cases/; see also Meena Yoo, Corporate Governance in a 
Post-Weinstein Era, FORDHAM L.J. CORP. AND FIN. L. BLOG (Jan. 6, 2018), https://news. 
law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/01/06/corporate-governance-in-a-post-weinstein-era/. 
309 Corporate Boards Aren’t Preparing for Sexual Harassment and Gender Discrimi-
nation Issues, THE MEDIUM: THE BOARDLIST (Oct. 24, 2017), https://medium.com/ 
@theBoardlist/corporate-boards-arent-preparing-for-sexual-harassment-and-gender-
discrimination-issues-24ba425d6497. 
2018] Corporate Diversity 2.0: 169 
Lessons from Silicon Valley’s Missteps 
the most common reason given by board members for not discussing 
the issue was that it did not feel like a board-level issue.310 However, 
this perception is set to change in the near future as shareholder actions 
on the issue gain momentum.311 Thus, it is now imperative that boards 
are provided with a more comprehensively framed diversity policy 
and/or best practice guidance that addresses these issues with concrete 
guidelines and solutions.  
B. Corporate Diversity 2.0: The Framework
Broadly, Corporate Diversity 2.0 (the diversity framework proposed 
in this Article) recognizes diversity in two tiers. In tier 1, it recognizes 
the importance of viewpoint diversity for its functional benefits at the 
board level. In tier 2, it recognizes demographic diversity 
complemented by inclusion and retention policies at all levels of the 
workforce to ensure workplace equality. These two tiers are 
interlinked, in that tier 2 diversity efforts will ensure that there are 
enough diverse candidates naturally retained in the corporate pipeline 
available for board positions. At the same time, valuing viewpoint 
diversity in tier 1 will not go against efforts to bring in and retain people 
of diverse demographics in the workforce. Further, it is expected that 
more women and minority members on the board and in executive 
positions will ensure that work environments are inclusive and 
responsive to issues of harassment and discrimination.312 This will also 
ensure that policy makers are able to individually identify and address 
the two separate issues of (1) homogenous boards leading to less 
optimal decision-making and (2) structural barriers impeding women 
and minority candidates from being retained within the corporate 
pipeline. 
310 Id. 
311 It has been argued, based on the fall in share prices of a company whose CEO was 
accused of sexual misconduct, that even an unproven allegation of sexual misconduct on the 
part of the CEO is a financial risk. See John Foley, Wynn Resorts’ Slide Shows Sexual 
Misconduct is a Financial Risk, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK/BUSINESS & POLICY (Jan. 26, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/business/dealbook/steve-wynn-sexual-
misconduct.html?mtrref=t.co.  
312 Marcia Narine Weldon, Will More Women on Boards Change Corporate Culture and 
Stem the Tide Of Harassment Complaints?, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF 
BLOG (Dec. 7, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2017/12/will-more-
women-on-boards-change-corporate-culture-and-stem-the-tide-of-harassment-
complaints.html. 
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For tier 1 diversity, which deals with diversity at the board level, it 
is important to focus on the value of diversity to the board because it 
enables the board to better perform its duties. Since the board is mainly 
tasked with monitoring management, viewpoint diversity would be 
essential to the board.313 In other words, we need members on the board 
of directors who are psychologically independent of management to 
challenge decisions or present alternative courses of action.314  
Since viewpoint diversity is not easily established, proxies like 
gender, age, nationality, qualifications, and experience might be 
used.315 Since not all companies are the same size, or operate in the 
same sector, or have the same circumstances, each company might 
have different needs at the board level. Thus, the United States’ SEC 
rule’s model of providing companies with the flexibility to define 
diversity according to their needs, is appropriate at the board level and 
should be retained. The misgivings expressed by the former chair of 
the SEC that companies had not focused on gender would not be 
relevant in tier 1 diversity, since aspects of gender equality will be the 
subject matter of tier 2 diversity under Corporate Diversity 2.0.316 
Further, in terms of the types of diversity that companies might 
consider at the board level, the Business Roundtable principles of 
corporate governance and Australia’s Commonsense Principles of 
Corporate Governance are helpful. They emphasize that the board 
should have diversity in the form of skill sets, backgrounds, 
experiences, viewpoints, and range of tenures to effectively perform its 
functions.317 
For tier 2 diversity, a generalized version of the guidelines provided 
by the Holder Committee should be provided in the form of soft law 
guidance for company compliance. Australia’s system of “comply or 
explain” might be an effective mechanism in the United States because 
investor groups are particularly aware and active on the issue of 
harassment, as the letter to Amazon’s CEO and the derivative action 
against 21CF shows. Additionally, all recommendations of the Holder 
Report might not be suitable for all companies because they were 
formulated specifically for Uber’s circumstances. Thus, a “comply or 
313 Kamalnath, supra note 124, at 103–06. 
314 See generally Erica Beecher-Monas, Marrying Diversity and Independence in the 
Boardroom: Just How Far Have You Come, Baby?, 86 OR. L. REV. 373 (2007). 
315 DAVID A.H. BROWN ET AL., WOMEN ON BOARDS: NOT JUST THE RIGHT THING . . . 
BUT THE ‘BRIGHT’ THING 5 (The Conference Board of Canada 2002). 
316 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2018). 
317 See discussion under section I(B) of this Article. 
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explain” style regulation will enable companies to provide investors 
with information regarding why certain recommendations were not 
adopted, if that is the case.  
Further, regulations in countries like Australia and the United 
Kingdom already provide for mentoring so as to help women 
candidates at executive levels break into board positions. Tier 2 
diversity regulations, along the lines of those provided by the Holder 
Committee, would extend such practices to all levels of the company 
to facilitate inclusion and retention of not just women employees but 
also other underrepresented groups.  
The relevance of the Holder Committee’s recommendations is 
apparent in the measures adopted by 21CF and those demanded by 
CtW. Most notably, although the public discourse on diversity has 
focused on gender diversity at the board level, it is significant that the 
21CF allegations include allegations relating to responses to sexual 
harassment and racial discrimination complaints. The Holder Report 
references inclusion and retention for both women and minority 
employees. Therefore, it is pertinent, under tier 2, to widen the diversity 
discourse from gender to include other types of diversity. If workplace 
equality is the goal, it must include all forms of equality under its ambit, 
rather than just gender equality. 
Thus, tier 2 diversity should aim to widen the diversity project in 
two aspects: To all levels of the corporate pipeline rather than just to 
the board of directors, and to all sections of employees who might face 
discrimination, unconscious bias, or other structural barriers in the 
workplace, rather than just to female employees.  
Ultimately, the soft law measures are more suitable to regulate both 
tier 1 and tier 2 diversity. Although quotas and targets might be 
tempting to adopt because numerical results of such measures are more 
immediately apparent, such measures do not solve the two problems 
identified in Part 1. Gender quota measures, like the ones in Norway, 
address only one form of diversity, namely gender diversity. Further, 
as stated earlier, the needs of each company are different and it is best 
to allow companies the flexibility to decide the types of diversity 
required on their boards. Also, gender quotas are unhelpful even if the 
goal is to address gender equality because such measures are only a 
temporary fix and do not ensure that there is a pool of diverse board-
ready women candidates available for board positions. This gives rise 
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to the “pool problem” as a counterargument against quotas.318 A soft 
law approach consisting of guidelines for companies and requiring 
related disclosures will be the optimal solution. 
CONCLUSION 
While existing corporate diversity laws have almost exclusively 
focused on the board of directors and on gender, it was unclear what 
problems such laws were attempting to solve. The rationales provided 
by policy papers and governments in various jurisdictions have further 
conflated, rather than clarified, the problems at hand. This Article has 
surveyed the relevant law and regulations in four jurisdictions and 
found two main issues that such laws have sought to address—namely, 
board effectiveness and equality in the workplace. Based on this 
finding, the Article has argued that the lack of clarity regarding the 
issues addressed is responsible for the suboptimal solutions offered.  
As the incidents at Google and Apple have shown, there is a need to 
reevaluate our thinking about corporate diversity. Further, the 
allegations of sexual harassment and hostile work conditions against 
Uber by a former employee, and similar claims by shareholders of 
Amazon and 21CF, have highlighted the need for revamping the 
diversity discourse in the corporate context. This Article has provided 
the blueprint for such a revamping via corporate diversity 2.0. After 
briefly pointing out that the board effectiveness issue would require a 
broader approach to diversity in terms of age, tenure, expertise, and 
viewpoint, this Article has focused on the second issue of workplace 
equality. Because the Holder Committee Report’s recommendations 
have the potential to serve as guidelines or best practices for companies 
seeking to address this issue, this Article has outlined the relevant 
recommendations and drawn from the report to formulate Corporate 
Diversity 2.0. Both companies and policy makers might draw from and 
expand upon this blueprint while formulating best practices or 
regulations in this regard. 
318 See, e.g., the “pool problem” articulated in Australia, CAMAC Report, supra note 
164, at 39. 
